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Abstract:  
A phenomenological study of chiasmic and haptic embodiment of the world through 
passage, in order to illustrate the reading of chalked stone inscriptions on South 
African koppies as “footnotes” to a landscape as text. 
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Introduction 
The art of the empty landscape is the pessimistic obverse of a wishful pastoral art that by 
the labour of hands makes the landscape speak, and peoples it with an ideal community. 
(Coetzee 1988:9) 
 
Let us imagine a white patch on a homogeneous background. All the points in the patch 
have a certain “function” in common, that of forming themselves into a “shape”. The colour 
of the shape is more intense, and as it were more resistant than that of the background; the 
edges of the white patch ‘belong’ to it, and are not part of the background although they 
adjoin it: the patch appears to be placed on the background and does not break it up. Each 
part arouses the expectation of more than it contains, and this elementary perception is 
therefore already charged with a meaning. But, if the shape and the background, as a 
whole, are not sensed, they must be sensed, one may object, in each of their points. To say 
this is to forget that each point in its turn can be perceived only as a figure on a 
background. (Merleau-Ponty 1962:4) 
 
The territory no longer precedes the map, nor does it survive it. It is nevertheless the map 
that precedes the territory . . . . (Baudrillard in Foster 1988:166) 
 
 
The phenomenon of “chalking” using white chalked stones is a familiar sight in the 
South African landscape. These white stones are used to mark property and place on 
the hillsides, often poignantly acquiring grave-like, bone-like associative qualities. In 
addition, they are most often in the format of recognisable signs such as crosses or 
written text, referring to place names, the names of farms, dates and a variety of 
religious-political vernaculars. The inscription of landscape by means of stone is by 
no means a purely South African phenomenon, and examples can be found globally. 
It can be argued these texts carry a basic reference to the age-old tradition of 
inscribing the landscape with stone such as those found in the stone circles in Europe 
or the large Nasca lines of Peru, but it is imperative to consider that there also exists 
a radical disparity between these. Rather than being tied to an ancient and 
presumably sacred symbology and significance, they are quite contemporary in their 
production and serve as reminder to recent colonial narratives. In this manner, they 
too are significant; they allow the readers of these large stone markings to 
investigate the landscape as text, with the stone inscriptions serving as 
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“historiographic invocations” (Benjamin in Cohen 1998:3) to the colonial past from 
within a post-colonial present.  
 
 
Figure 1:   
Large chalked stone inscriptions in Laingsburg, Great Karoo, South Africa 
 
With the chalked stone inscriptions on our koppies, we find the domains of different 
epistemologies revealed: most of these sites expose information about the specific 
claiming of landscape; it discloses the use of cheap or correctional labour and 
ultimately allows for an investigation of the vernacular and the maintenance of social 
hierarchies through language and text. As an example, let us consider one of the 
locally more famous inscriptions as found on the central koppie in the district of 
Laingsburg in the Great Karoo (figure 1). In large white letters the reader is 
instructed in Afrikaans to “DRA WOL” (directly translated to mean “wear wool”). I 
have often marvelled at this appeal, directed at the passer-by as a request for a 
consumerist response to a local product or as large scale reminder and command to 
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the local inhabitants of Laingsburg, almost authoritatively demanding that they “wear 
wool”. As such, the command (as with examples of stone inscriptions referring to 
place names) is reminiscent of a literal “writing on the wall”, following a Menetekel-
like1 function of making the voice of authority visible. In the case of Laingsburg, it is 
the Wool Council that speaks. In other cases we find the presence of a religious and 
colonial voice, for example in the Christian promise that “Jesus Christ is Lord of all” 
(Beeld 2006.06.08) as seen on the farm of John Liversage in Mkondu, Mpumalanga 
(figure 2) and in colonial toponymic references to leaders such as Sir Harry Smith on 
the koppie of “Smithfield” in the Free State (figure 3). Other examples include 
descriptive toponymic clues to the names of farms or nearby locales (see figure 4 & 
5), as well as cases of grand scale advertising (see figure 6 & 7). 
 
Figure 2:  
Christian stone inscription on the farm of John Liversage in  
Mkondu, Mpumalanga 
South Africa 
                                           
1 The writing on the wall (or sometimes 'handwriting on the wall') is an expression that suggests the 
visualisation of the voice of authority. It originates in the Biblical book of Daniel where supernatural 
writing foretells the demise of the Babylonian Empire, but it has come to have a wide usage in language 
and literature. The words “Mene men tekel upharsin” translates into “measured, measured and found 
wanting”.  
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Figure 3:  
Inscription on koppie: SMITHFIELD 
South Africa 
 
 
Figure 4:  
Inscription on koppie: MOOIFONTEIN 
South Africa 
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Figure 5:  
Inscription on koppie: BOUGAINVILLEA 
South Africa 
 
 
Figure 6:  
Inscription on koppie: LODGE 
South Africa 
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Figure 7:  
Inscription on koppie: OORD RESORT 
South Africa 
 
 
This dissertation is primarily concerned with a phenomenological approach to the 
reading of the chalked stone inscriptions on South African koppies, and holds that 
these inscriptions serve as literal “footnotes” to the reading of landscape as text. In 
this sense, space is organised into a sequence of narration by means of a route, with 
the text in the landscape speaking to a broader narrative.  
 
In the following chapters I will investigate the critical aspects related to the 
development of an understanding of the text in the landscape as a key phenomenon 
concerning the chiasmic and haptic embodiment of the world through passage. Our 
investigation will pursue the course of a brief enquiry into the discourses around 
naming, text and image in Chapter 1, followed by an assessment of the 
phenomenological framework in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 and 4 will look into the ocular 
agenda of the inscription and representation of the landscape and the significant role 
performed by the moving viewer or passer-by in the production of topographical 
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space. Chapter 5 provides a brief survey of the artistic project and exhibition entitled 
As Far As The Eye Can Touch that served as practical component to my MA (FA), 
documenting a series of text based and mostly large-scale poetic interventions in the 
landscape. 
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1. Naming Place 
 
White invasion was a form of spatial writing that erased the earlier meaning.  
(Carter in Arthur 2003:53) 
 
The limit of a name serves, like a verbal fence, to enclose an individual place as a spatial 
self. 
(Frake in Feld & Basso 1996:235) 
 
As a child, the notion of having the responsibility of giving a place, street or an area 
a name appeared to be a very important job indeed, and whenever I had a chance I 
would imagine naming my “own” places that still awaited naming: the koppie behind 
the Pick ‘n Pay, the stretch of land where you could find heaps of quarts crystals, the 
peculiar site where a cement factory left their rubble, the mesmerizing storm water 
drains next to the big road. . . . I grew up in Verwoerdburg (now Centurion)2, just 
outside Pretoria (now Tswane)3, and stayed in an area identified by the names of 
rivers and stones: Limpopo Avenue, Zambezi Avenue, Molopo Avenue, Diamond 
Avenue, Turquoise Street, and our own: Jasper Avenue.  
 
Under standard contemporary South African procedure, the Post Office, a property 
developer or a governmental body such as a local authority generally makes the 
application for the approval of a name. After 1994 more than three-quarters of all 
                                           
2 Verwoerdburg is a satellite city south of Pretoria, with a predominantly Afrikaans, conservative 
population, home to the South African military establishment. Formed by the amalgamation of various 
townships whose names are still to be found as suburbs, such as Clubview and Lyttleton, it acquired 
municipal status in 1964 and was named Verwoerdburg in 1967, a year after Hendrik Verwoerd was 
assassinated. It was renamed to Centurion in 1995, making it the first town in the world to be named 
after a sports stadium (Jenkins 2007:148 - 150). 
3 In 2005, during the 150th anniversary of the founding of Pretoria, the ANC-governed City of Tswane 
Metropolitan Council decided to change the name of the city of Pretoria to Tswane. The Voortrekkers 
named the city after their leader, Andries Pretorius; in the mid 19th century the Nguni-speaking people 
adapted the new name to ePitoli; and during the apartheid era, Tswane had appeared on railway 
destination boards for third-class (black) carriages. In 2000 Tswane officially became the name of the local 
authority for the whole of greater Pretoria.  
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the names accepted were for post offices and other postal facilities such as agencies. 
Post offices had always formed a large proportion of new names, but after the 1994 
South African democratic elections this noticeably increased as the Post Office 
committed itself to giving every citizen a postal address, bringing postal facilities 
within his or her reach4. As part of its new development programme, the South 
African Post Office post-1994 sent out field-workers to sound out local communities 
on the names they sought after for their post offices, clearly marking an amendment 
from the Apartheid past when bureaucrats sitting in offices would make the 
selections, which were in some were cases, unashamedly ideological (Jenkins 2007). 
 
The naming and classification of particular topographical features of sites, whether 
settlement, mountain peak or farm, is vital to the establishment and maintenance of 
their identity; essentially, “names create landscapes” (Tilley 1994:19). Through the 
act of naming and through the development of human associations, such places 
become endowed with significance and meaning. Place names are of crucial 
importance because they serve to alter the completely physical and geographical into 
something that is historically and socially experienced, creating a shared existential 
space out of a so-called “blank” environment (Weiner 1991:32, Basso 1984:27).  
 
Correspondingly, in White Writing: on the culture of letters in South Africa, J.M. 
Coetzee reflects on the colonial idea that “landscape remains alien, impenetrable, 
until a language is found in which to win it, speak it, represent it” (1988:7). By 
                                           
4 A few names record the response of communities, like Kgopudi (‘a dream to remember about the wish to 
have a postal service’), Lamolatlala (‘taking hunger away from the people – post-boxes will bring 
registered letters containing money’), Moleboge (‘thanks to the Post Office for the service it brings’) 
(Jenkins 2007:1).  
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naming places and things, they become confined in social discourses and act as 
mnemonics for the historical actions of individuals or groups (Tilley 1994:18). It is 
one thing to name a place, another to write that name on a place. Historiographically 
speaking, South African “readers” of the landscape are faced with a colonial writing 
on the koppie as a “wall”, a tabula, or a surface that is allegedly awaiting inscription. 
It is in this colonial approach to the landscape as supposedly “empty” or semiotically 
“mute”, that we find the principle which Coetzee (1988:9) describes as “the labour of 
hands [that] makes the landscape speak”. It is through the working of the land, the 
physical transformation of landscape, the naming of place that the landscape is 
purportedly given a “voice”. But it is also via this “voice” that we find a revealing of 
the historiographic claiming of landscape through naming and inscription as a 
reflection on the annexation of our world (and its ordering processes) in a concrete 
manner. 
 
The naming of place is not only a necessary means of recognition and 
communication, but also a fundamental means of laying claim to territory. The 
process of naming is more than a value–free description of a point in space; it is also 
a means of conveying and nurturing senses of place and linking these with selected 
facets of the past (Ashworth & Graham 2005:16). Colonisation is a route in 
geographical space with a perspective of knowledge of “here” and “there”, at first 
differentiating between spaces that have been colonised and those which have not, 
and then between those which have been brought more closely into the area of 
colonial knowledge (Arthur 2003:54). The act of colonisation, the act of crossing the 
landscape, was not only a physical event but also a conceptual one, with colonial 
knowing commencing with the “unknowing” of local knowledge in order to make it 
possible to “create” the place as an “unknown” space.  
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Paul Carter (Steddon 1998:24) argues that historically “explorers” did not objectively 
record the land before them, instead they invented places to conform to European 
needs and expectations, naming – which was in fact a re-naming – gave substance 
to their inventions. 
Explorers were not dispatched to traverse deserts, but to locate objects of 
cultural significance: rivers, mountains, meadows, plains of promise. They 
had a social responsibility to make most of what they saw, to dignify even 
hints of the habitable with significant class names. They were expected to 
arrest the country, to concentrate it into reversible roads, which would 
summarize its content; they were expected to translate its extension into 
objects of commerce (Carter 1987:56).  
 
This inevitably brings the discussion to the politics of space itself; if space is to be 
measured as a medium for action, a resource which players draw on in their activity 
and use for their own intentions, it inevitably becomes value-laden rather than 
value-free and political rather than neutral. To the colonialist mind, once a space has 
been stripped of its original, unrefined and indigenous sedimented human 
meanings5, and considered to be completely epiphenomenal and extraneous, the 
landscape becomes a surface or volume like any other, “open” for utilization and 
homogeneous in all places in its latent exchange value for any particular 
development (Tilley 1994:21). 
 
The establishment of a “European landscape” in indigenous spaces like Africa or 
Australia has been created through a process involving a change in land use and a 
break with the previous histories of the land, amounting to a manner of denial that 
the land had a preceding history. Europeans occupied what (to them) was a 
previously unutilised environment, with the objective to “release” the potential of the 
land. In the language of the colonist, terra incognita was used in a historical sense to 
illustrate the status of the land before widespread occupation by colonists, referring 
                                           
5 As were to be found in pre-colonial South Africa, Australia and all other indigenous pre-colonies. 
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to large areas of land, not travelled across and reported about by non-indigenous 
people. In this manner the land is viewed as “unknown” even though the colonial 
society is at the same time aware of the previous and continuing occupation of the 
native society. In this sense, “the ‘unknown’ is concurrent with something that can 
be ‘discovered’ (not ‘visited’ or ‘travelled to’)” (Arthur 2003:56). 
 
The past of the “new” land had no existence except as it was reflected through the 
clashes of the moment. Instead, the colonists brought with them an “old” past in the 
form of distant landscapes and toponymic references which aided their 
conceptualisation and prospect of the “new” land (Morphy in Bender 1993:206 - 
207).  
 
Names are firmly bound up with power and identity; attempts to change them can 
stoke major unease. Perhaps it is because of this that the South African post-
apartheid government moved rather slowly to alter names. In 2005 it was reported 
that 57 000 South African place names were up for amendment by the South African 
Geographical Names Council. These included place names that demean, such as 
Kafferspruit and Boesmanskraal, and town names that duplicate those of other 
centres in South Africa or elsewhere in the world, such as Bethlehem, Parys, Morija, 
Ladysmith and Middelburg. Towns with names of colonial origin, such as George, 
Grahamstown and Queenstown, are also being considered (Mail & Guardian 
2005.03.11). 
 
It is perhaps not astonishing to find that, as one people or political hegemony steps 
into the shoes of another, existing names are replaced: at the end of the Vietnam 
War, the communists changed Saigon to Ho Chi Minh City; in Russia, St Petersburg 
went through a process of being renamed Petrograd, then Leningrad, and is now 
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called St Petersburg again. One finds numerous examples of this in the former 
communist bloc countries of central Europe, and it is also not unusual to find this 
phenomenon in the Southern African subcontinent. Southern Africa holds a mass 
history of successive peoples that have been naming and renaming its geographical 
features, ranging from the hunter-gatherer San, the pastoral Khoi, the African, the 
Portuguese along the coast, the Dutch, French, British and other European and 
Indian immigrant influences (Jenkins 2007).  
 
In resonance with a worldwide colonial impulse, the Voortrekkers generally replaced 
indigenous names in the interior of South Africa, often favouring descriptive and 
expressive names or the names of their leaders (Jenkins 2007:79). One specific and 
well-known case in KwaZulu-Natal exemplifies the tragic history of the dealings 
between whites and indigenous people: Bloedriver6, also later called Blood River by 
English-speakers, is paradoxically called Ncome (beautiful) in isiZulu. Distinctly, the 
English settlers who came to KwaZulu-Natal in the middle of the 19th century did not 
alter many indigenous names, instead they followed the imperialist pattern seen 
elsewhere (for example in Canada), where they would often give new names that 
repeated place names from Britain and elsewhere in the Empire. Often this would be 
encouraged by an apparent resemblance in the locality, at other times by nostalgia. 
Less kindly, these choices might be attributed to arrogance or the lack of 
imagination. By the same token, it was popular to use the names of royalty, public 
figures and officials, followed by missionaries, clerics, military men and pioneers 
(Stayt 1971): Prince Albert, King William’s Town, Queenstown, Somerset East, 
Somerset West, Beaufort West, Fort Beaufort, Sir Lowry’s Pass, Colesberg, Port 
Frances, Malmesbury, to name a few. 
                                           
6 Bloedriver was the scene of a battle between the Voortrekkers and the Zulus on 16 December 1838 in 
which the Zulus were decimated and the river ran with their blood. 
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There has been much criticism on both the English and Afrikaans names given to 
South African places, as Reverent Charles Pettman (Jenkins 2007:81) 
unsympathetically stated:  
Travellers and others have often remarked upon the sameness and 
baldness of much of our South African nomenclature; it is characterised 
generally by a want of nice and accurate discrimination, by not a little 
repetition, … and also by a considerable amount of real ugliness, 
testifying to a lack of originality, a paucity of idea, and to an almost entire 
absence or aesthetic fancy on the part of the owners of the soil – some of 
the native names would have been vastly preferable. 
Similarly, writes Thomas Pringle (ibid) in Thompson’s Travels and Adventures in 
Southern Africa (1827): 
It is strange to observe the barrenness of fancy of the boors (sic) in 
giving names to places. In every quarter of the Colony we find Brak River, 
Zwart River, Zeekoe River, Palmiet River, Baviaan’s Kloof, and so forth; 
the appellation being given generally for some quality common to many 
places, and seldom with that nice and accurate discrimination which 
seizes the distinctive and peculiar features alone, and embodies them in 
the name. 
As a democratic system, the contemporary South African multilingualism 
necessitates difficult decisions in the design of the country’s official maps by the 
Directorate of Surveys and Mapping. Up until now, it used to construct the 1:50 000 
maps bilingually in both Afrikaans and English, and applied to features such as 
headings and the legend, providing details on scale and symbology. The maps are 
still bilingual, but instead of Afrikaans and English carrying main focus, they now 
feature English and one other language – typically the language deemed to be the 
principal tongue of the region represented in the map. It is not easy to produce map 
legends in the African languages. In South Africa, there are various parallel names 
for the same places: with regional and alternative, local names, one finds that 
indigenous geographical terminology has often not been officially standardised and 
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there is often a difference in translations (Jenkins 2007:88). In addition, another 
kind of parallel naming existed pre-1994: 
If you look at a standard map of South Africa, you will see the names of 
many villages, towns and cities. However, you will not see the names of 
places where most South African live. Most maps will not show you where 
Khayelitsha or Mamelodi is – yet each of them has more than 300 000 
residents, placing them in the largest 20 urban settlements in South 
Africa. Probably none of them will show you where Winterveld is – yet it 
has a population of around 400 000 people. . . . In this sense, our 
contemporary maps are inadequate, and this needs to be redressed 
(Payne & Stickler in Jenkins 2007:89). 
Black, coloured and Indian residential areas had to be mapped, listed and cross-
indexed, both attached and free-standing to “white” towns (Jenkins 2007:89), with 
the Automobile Association since following suit by providing in brackets under the 
name of each town the names of the principal residential areas that were formerly 
zoned for so-called “non-Europeans”.  
 
The theoretical study of names, onomastics, suggests that name changes are to 
some level unnecessary, seeing as over a period of time the literal significance of a 
proper name is lost. On the other hand, it is important to acknowledge that people 
do pay attention to the origin, meaning and language of names, even if the approach 
is uninformed (Jenkins 2003). The landscape is a “blackboard” that announces 
epistemological domains, inasmuch as it was historically crucial to “write” the 
landscape and, perhaps more engagingly, in how it is still possible to “read” the 
landscape in this historic format. Let us now consider the topographic dialogue 
between image and text.  
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A snow covered mountain, its white peak highlighted by sunlight, clear blue sky 
behind it: a Swiss landscape perhaps? Across the side of the mountain one can read 
a strangely ambiguous piece of text that looks as if it is actually being projected onto 
the face of the mountain itself: an advertisement, a slice of a billboard, a view 
through a shop window, a vitreous eye floater? 
 
Figure 8:  
Ed Ruscha  
-So  
1999  
64 by 64 cm  
Private Collection  
Courtesy Anthony d’Offay Gallery, London 
 
Those who are familiar with the work of Ed Ruscha will know that this is clearly no 
advertisement but rather his 1999 painting called “-So”. It may indeed pursue the 
language of advertising and, despite the linguistic games that the work might 
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employ, the image also moves beyond that of an easy and commoditised visual to 
one that engages the viewer in two distinct modes of information gathering – one 
involving the basic visual scanning of the image and the other the reading of words. 
The visual scanning of the image allows for the freedom of mental and sensual 
movement, and an openness of interpretation, with the reading of the text; the 
reader is confined to a predetermined route constructed from a horizontal row of 
letters to be deciphered from left to right and top to bottom. Without a doubt, the 
activities of seeing and reading take place at quite dissimilar tempos and engage 
different orderings of perception – the brain has to organize consciousness in distinct 
ways for each separate activity and plainly cannot do both simultaneously.  
There are various interactions between the visual and the verbal sign. Morley (2003) 
singles four interactions out: firstly the trans-medial relationship. In this context, 
word and work are linked by way of transposition or substitution: the one is 
fundamentally supplemental to the other. This might include any kind of writing or 
imaging in which the linguistic and the visual continue to be clearly notable both in 
time and in space, and in relation to the separation of labour. This implies a 
hierarchy in which the text remains subordinate to the image (or vice versa), for 
example illustrated books, art criticism, theoretical discourses, or gallery wall labels. 
In more contemporary approaches to this relationship, the clarity of the division is 
blurred when artists take on the literary roles once laid aside for others, either 
writing within the traditional sites of literary discourse or else bringing words into the 
art gallery (see figure 9).  
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Figure 9:  
Joseph Kosuth 
One and Three Chairs 
1965 
A folding chair, a photograph of a chair and a photographic enlargement of a 
dictionary definition of a chair. 
Chair 82 x 37.8 x 53 cm, photographic panel 91.5 x 61 cm, text panel 61 x 61.3 cm 
Museum of Modern Art, New York 
 
Secondly, we find the multi-medial relationship, where word and image coexist more 
closely, partaking in the same space, though remaining evidently distinguished in 
terms of spatial relations, kind of intelligibility and often the division of labour. A 
good example of this category would be a shop sign, an advertisement or an artwork 
that incorporates title, caption or some clarifying text while still keeping word and 
image spatially and cognitively isolated. In the text of the 1430 Fra Angelico’s 
painting on the Annunciation of Mary, the viewer is introduced to an early forerunner 
of the speech bubble, there to secure and specify the Christian message also carried 
by the image (see figure 10).  
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Figure 10: 
Fra Angelico 
Annunciation (detail) 
1432 - 1433 
Tempera on wood 
175 by 180 
Museo Diocesano, Cortona 
 
A third association to consider is the mixed-media relationship, where word and 
image have less fundamental unity and are only minimally separated from each 
other, having been transferred into one another’s usual domains. From a pre-modern 
world we find a good example of this relationship in the emblem; while the modern 
world proves to be an exceptionally fertile ground for this relation, with artists often 
referring to the landscape of the sign that constitutes the urban environment (think 
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of Richard Estes’ work) or borrowing basic stylistic elements (consider Ruscha’s “-
So”). The fourth relation that Morley (2003) discloses is the inter-media relationship. 
Examples range from the medieval Book of Kells (see figure 11), to Dürer’s artist 
monogram (see figure 12); here one locates writing in a strikingly visual form. The 
recognition of the visual, material face of letters (and of the performative and 
sensory aspects to the act of writing) is as much at the centre of the traditional 
practice of calligraphy, as it is of topography. Consider the contemporary extremes of 
deconstructivist design, and the work produced by designers such as Neville Brody 
and David Carson. This category emphasises the fact that writing is undeniably a 
visual language, that is it is something that appeals to the eye as well as to the mind 
(Morley 2003: 12).  
    
Figure 11:    Figure 12: 
Book of Kells    Dürer’s Monogram 
c. 800 
Folio 8 recto, beginning of the  
Breves causae of Matthew 
Manuscript illumination 
Trinity College Library, Dublin 
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In chronological terms, the spatialisation and visualisation of language through the 
technology of writing originates after the basic development of complex systems of 
coded sounds. The origins of writing is said to lie with the development of explicitly 
visual modes of communication such as pictographic and ideographic forms that were 
totally independent from speech (Morley 2003:13). It was the innovation of the 
alphabet, though, that transformed writing into a medium intending to document or 
record of the spoken word. Hereafter it would be seen as secondary to oral language 
and be used in an increasingly non-pictorial manner (particularly in the West). The 
advance of moveable type further added to this circumstance: Gutenberg’s fifteenth 
century invention allowed writing to become a homogeneous and mechanised 
medium, ordered and housed within the space and format of the folio. In spite of 
image-making and writing sharing a common root, the activity of inscription became 
resolutely detached from the traditions of image making and its origins in the bodily 
gesture. Merleau-Ponty (1962: 401) remarks on the typical experience of reading a 
printed page: 
The wonderful thing about language is that it promotes its own oblivion . . 
. . My eyes follow the line on the paper and from the moment I am 
caught up in their meaning, I lose sight of them. The paper, the letters on 
it, my eye and the body are there only as the minimum setting of some 
invisible operation. Expression fades before what is expressed, and this is 
why its mediating role may pass unnoticed. 
We can concur that the inter-medial relation between word and image exposes the 
notion that writing and image-making share a common origin: that they share a 
visual nature of inscription and a basic language of technology (such as chisel, brush 
or pen). However, the inter-medial has in modern contexts come to indicate more 
than a mere melding of visual and verbal on a two-dimensional surface; in the 
framework of art and mass media, we find a radical reconsideration of the 
boundaries between the various media, generally involving the amalgamation of 
varied spaces, movements and sounds into a “total work of art” (Morley 2003:14). 
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Here, we find a vastly expanded field of communication and information; it is no 
longer possible to speak of specific genres, either visual or verbal.  
We cannot image how a mind would paint . . . it is by lending his body to 
the world that the artist changes the world into paintings. To understand 
these transubstantiations we must go back to the working, actual body – 
not the chunk of space or a bundle of functions but that body which is an 
intertwining of vision and movement (Merleau-Ponty in Johnson 
1993:123-124). 
In place of a blatantly linear, hierarchical and segregated association between 
reading and writing, seeing and reading, one finds an engagement with what has 
been called “topographic” space, “a space in which writing is severed from its role as 
mere verbal description and instead is experienced as both a verbal and visual 
phenomenon” (Bolter 1991:62). 
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2. A Subjective Epistemology: Phenomenological Approaches to Space 
and Place 
 
What is geography beyond the charting of landmasses, climate zones, elevations, bodies of waters, 
populated terrains, nation states, geological strata and natural resource deposits? 
(Rogoff 2000:21) 
 
Geography: the very root meaning of the term is literally that of “earth writing”, 
from the Greek geo, meaning “earth”’, and graphien, meaning to “write” (Barnes & 
Duncan 1992:1). In Terra Infirma, Irit Rogoff (2000) states that geography is a 
concept, a sign system and an order of knowledge that is established at the centres 
of power. As an epistemic category, geography is rooted in matters of positionality, 
in questions of who has the authority and power to name, of who has the authority 
to subsume others into its identity. Thus the critical activity which positions 
geography follows an active form of un-naming, re-naming and the revising of such 
power structures in terms of the relations between subjects and places (Rogoff 
2000:21).  
 
The relation between the discourses on geography and those on space, are essential 
to this discussion. Human geography and archaeology have seen numerous 
convergences; both practices had until the 1960s been largely empiricist in approach 
and occupied with a concern in difference and distinctiveness. Human geography was 
subject to the study of regions at various spatial scales, in this way dealing with 
Africa, Asia, North America, Canada or Britain as a whole. Similarly, archaeology was 
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concerned with space-time systematics and the ordering of artefacts and other 
evidence into cultural units within a delimited territorial area with a supposed ethnic 
significance. With the introduction of “new” geography and “new” archaeology, there 
occurred a “replacement” of these perspectives with a more positivist functionalism, 
making room for the notion of geography as spatial science and archaeology as a 
science of the past.  
New geography and new archaeology viewed space as an abstract dimension or 
container in which human activities and events took place, implying that activity, 
event and space were conceptually and physically separate from another and only 
contingently connected. Such an outlook on space decentred it from agency and 
meaning, proclaiming it as something that could be objectively measured as part of 
an abstracted geometry of scale, with space literally seen as a “nothingness”, a 
simple surface for action, without depth (Hunt, Lipo, Sterling 2001). This view 
further maintained that space is seen as universal, everywhere and anywhere the 
same, with a cross-cultural impact on society and people. Thus the effects of 
distance and the changing possibilities of locations and sites could be objectively 
applied to one and the same spatial scale of measurement (Tilley 1994). As 
container, surface and volume, space was significant inasmuch as it existed in itself 
and for itself, external to and indifferent to human affairs, thus neutral and separate 
from any consideration of structures of power and domination. The lure of this 
approach was, without doubt, the room it offered for objective and comparative 
study, with new geography providing the basis for a mathematical spatial 
archaeology (Clarke 1977, Tilley 1994). As Wissler states: “the real equipment of an 
archaeologist is a scientific mind” (Hunt, Lipo & Sterling 2001:xi). As a result and as 
part of the re-theorisation of human geography and archaeology in the 1970s and 
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1980s, the value of a “scientific” conception of space abstracted from human affairs 
have been called into question (Soja 1989, Bender 1992, Tilley 1994, Harvey 1973). 
Alternatively, space can be seen as ontologically grounded in the differential 
structuring of human experience and action in the world. Phenomenologically, space 
is to be viewed as a medium rather than a container for action, as something that is 
involved in the action and not separate to it. As such, space cannot exist apart from 
the events and activities with which it is occupied; it is socially produced, and 
different groups, individuals and societies will act out their lives in different spaces. 
Thus space in itself no longer happens to be a “meaningful term”: “there is no space, 
only spaces” (Tilley 1994:10). As social productions these spaces are always 
meaningfully centred in relation to human agency and are expressly able to change 
because their formation takes place as part of the day-to day praxis of individuals 
and groups.  
A centred and meaningful space involves specific sets of linkages between 
the physical and space of the non-humanly created world, somatic states 
of the body, the mental space of cognition and representation and the 
space of movement, encounter and interaction between persons and 
between persons and the human and non-human environment (Tilley 
1994:10). 
Space possesses a relational significance, explicitly developed via the relation 
between people and places; because different individuals and societies understand it 
differently, it can have no universal essence. In this sense, space depends on who is 
experiencing it and how, and is intimately related to the formation of biographies and 
social relationships (Tilley 1994). The key matter in the phenomenological approach 
to space is the way in which people experience and understand the world. 
Phenomenology is a philosophy for which the world is always ‘already 
there’ before reflection begins – as an inalienable presence; and all its 
efforts are concentrated upon re-achieving a direct and primitive contact 
with the world, and endowing that contact with a philosophical status . . . 
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It also offers an account of space, time and the world as we “live” them 
(Merleau-Ponty 1962:vii). 
Phenomenology involves the interpretive study of human experience, and aims to 
scrutinise and explain human actions, positions, meanings, and experience "as they 
spontaneously occur in the course of daily life" (von Eckartsberg 1998:3). It is about 
the relation between Being and Being-in-the-world, involving an investigation of the 
comprehension and description of things as a subject experiences them. Being-in-
the-world is thought to exist in a process of objectification in which we objectify the 
world by placing ourselves separately from it, autonomously constructing a gap, a 
distance in space. It is of the very essence of being human that we create the 
distance between the self and that which is beyond or “other”, that we constantly 
attempt to bridge this gap by means of certain deeds or “doings”, including bodily 
actions and movements, and perception (sight, touch and hearing). Thus “we get 
into place, move and stay there with our bodies“(Casey 1997:239). 
Both Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty accentuate the relationship between inhabited 
space and our social Being-in-the-world. Heidegger (1971) maintains that spaces 
take delivery of their essential being not from “space” but from locations. A scientific 
or mathematical “space” of measurement is not humanised, therefore it can have no 
spaces, places or locations because, according to Heidegger, spaces open up by the 
virtue of the dwelling of humanity. In Heideggerian terms, “staying with things” or 
“dwelling” is an elemental part of that which makes us human, with the body 
necessarily the vantage point from which we understand the world. Merleau-Ponty 
argues that the human body provides the fundamental mediation point between 
thought and the world: 
Any perception of a thing, a shape or a size as real, any perceptual 
constancy refers back to the positioning of a world and of a system of 
experience in which my body is inescapably linked with phenomena. But 
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the system of experience is not arrayed before me as if I were God, it is 
lived by me from a certain point of view; I am not the spectator, I am 
involved, and it is my involvement in a point of view which makes 
possible both the finiteness of my perception and its opening out upon the 
complete world as a horizon of every perception (Merleau-Ponty 
1962:303). 
In this sense, the world and the subject chiasmically flow into another through the 
body as living bond with the world, with notions of “subject”, “object”, 
“consciousness” and “nature” totalled and dialectically related through the Being of 
the body in the world. Perceptual consciousness, or awareness, is thus not merely a 
matter of reflection about the world; it also derives from bodily presence in relation 
to bodily awareness. As Merleau-Ponty states: “far from my body’s being for me no 
more than a fragment of space, there would be no space at all for me if I had no 
body” (1962:102). Accordingly, we can say that we always find ourselves in places, 
however different the places themselves may be and however differently we construe 
and exploit them; it literarily serves as a “pre-position” inasmuch as we are already 
in place, never not emplaced in one way or another (Casey in Feld & Basso 
1996:17). 
The relationship between body and subjectivity is neither necessary nor accidental, it 
is contingent. The locatedness of the body accentuates the “place character” of space 
(Casey 1993, 1997). The body is always in place; we cannot escape this fact. More 
significant, however, is the manner in which the body itself is spatial. Merleau-Ponty 
states that the spatiality of the body is not a spatiality of position but one of 
situation, with the implication that we should avoid thinking of our bodies as being 
merely in space or in time, rather, our bodies inhabit space and time: 
I am not in space an time, nor do I conceive space and time; I belong to 
them, my body combines with them and includes them. The scope of this 
inclusion is the measure of that of my existence (Merleau-Ponty 
1962:140). 
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In view of this, active bodies, using the obtained systems and habits, position their 
world around themselves and constitute that world as “ready-to-hand” (Heidegger 
1962:83). And, in being active and hence able to move, our bodies “measure” space 
and time in their active construction of a meaningful world. Accordingly, meaning 
and matter is intertwined. For Merleau-Ponty, the material world is not juxtaposed 
with an ideational world, as Crossley states: 
Merleau-Ponty refuses to separate the ideational and the material. All 
ideas and meanings are necessarily embodied (in books, rituals, speech, 
buildings, etc.), he maintains, and all matter embodies meaning and 
derives its place in the human world by virtue of that meaning… In this 
sense then he calls our attention . . . to the embodiment of culture, and 
he extends his argument against the abstraction of meaning and matter 
(Crossley 1995:59).  
In his emphasis on social practice, Lefebvre (1991:61) establishes a material basis 
for the production of space, which consists of “a practical and fleshy body conceived 
of as totality complete with spatial qualities (symmetries, asymmetries) and 
energetic properties (discharges, economies, waste)”. In discussion of Lefebvre’s 
notions of body and space, Simonsen (2004:49) stipulates that the key prerequisite 
to the material production of space is that each living body is and has its space; it 
produces itself in space at the same time that it produces that space. In this manner, 
Lefebvre is echoing the ideas of Merleau-Ponty; in allocating a central role to the 
body in the “lived experience”, the body representing a practico-sensory realm in 
which space is perceived through sight, smells, tastes, touch and hearing. The body 
subsequently produces a space that is both anthropological and biomorphic and will 
develop a relationship to the environment by means of a process of demarcation and 
orientation. These processes pull together under the notion of the “spatial body”, and 
that “a body so conceived, as produced and as the production of space, is 
immediately subject to the determinants of that space” (Lefebvre 1991:195). As a 
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result, the spatial body’s material character derives from space, from the energy that 
is deployed and put to use there. 
 
There is clearly a necessary affiliation between the body, practice and time-space; 
“body-subject” relation with space involves an active engagement with the 
surrounding world and concerns a production of meaning. 
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3. Inscribing the Landscape 
The strata of sedimentary rock are like the pages of a book, each with a record of 
contemporary life written on it. 
(Winterson 2005:x) 
 
Texts have ways of existing that even in their most rarefied form are always enmeshed in 
circumstance, time, place, and society - in short, they are in the world, and hence worldly. 
(Said 1983:35) 
 
Vigilant is derived from the Latin vigilare, to watch, which in its French form veiller is the 
root of surveillance. Demonstrate comes from the Latin monstrare, to show. Inspect, 
prospect, introspect (and other words like aspect or circumspect) all derive from the Latin 
specere, to look at or observe. Speculate has the same root. Scope comes from the Latin 
scopium, a translation of a Greek word for to look at or examine. Synopsis is from the Greek 
word for general view. These are latent or dead metaphors, but they still express the 
sedimented importance of the visual in the English language. 
(Jay 1993a:1) 
Landscape is necessarily an unclear, ambiguous concept that encompasses both the 
physical and the conceptual; the term itself is uncertain, its meaning sliding between 
the actual and the virtual, the real and the represented. It refers both to the physical 
fact of inland scenery and the representations of that scenery. Daniels and Cosgrove 
see landscape as always and inexorably a kind of representation executed in a 
variety of materials and on many surfaces, be it paint on canvas or earth, stone, 
water, or vegetation on the ground. To them "a landscape park is more palpable but 
no more real, nor less imaginary, than a landscape painting or poem" (Daniels & 
Cosgrove 1988:1). Mitchell underpins the view of landscape as representation, by 
stating that: 
Landscape is itself a physical and multi-sensory medium . . . in which 
cultural meanings and values are encoded, whether they are put there by 
the physical transformation of a place in landscape gardening and 
architecture, or found in a place formed, as we say, by nature. . . . 
Landscape is already artifice in the moment of its beholding, long before it 
becomes the subject of pictorial representation (Mitchell 1994:14). 
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Traditionally and historically, the term “landscape” had frequently been employed in 
a particular, elitist way of seeing; an imposing, imposed viewpoint that emerged 
alongside, and as part of, the development of mercantile capital in Western Europe. 
This can be seen as just one kind of definition of landscape which, even for those 
who have enjoyed “finer prospects”, is perceived of in very different ways depending 
on finely graded and gendered subtleties of class (Williams 1973, Daniels & Cosgrove 
1993). Furthermore, as can be seen in the historiographic traditions of South Africa, 
this class-driven viewpoint typically suppresses the landscape of those “being 
viewed” or “out of sight”. It ignores the labour that has gone into landscape and 
obscures the relationships between landscapes – the connections, for example, 
between the worked landscape of fields and factories and the sheltered, isolated 
farmhouses, landscape gardens and parks (Said 1989). 
 
As discussed earlier, the late 20th century’s reconsideration of New cultural 
geography has called for a closer look into the mathematical and homogenised 
systems of description and representation of space, which had often not been fully 
concerned with the different individual experiences of a place and its disparate social 
contexts (Soja 1989, Bender 1992, Tilley 1994, Harvey 1973). “Landscape is not a 
universal concept, applied in the same way by all people at all times, and thus 
cannot represent a definitive way of apprehending the world” (Thomas in Bender 
1993:20). The South African landscape, in its actively stratified and multi-temporal 
histories, bears witness to a reconsideration of these homogenising approaches. It 
cannot be denied that our landscape has long been and still is a way to observe and 
to examine our different cultural environments, but it is by no means a singular 
investigation. We find this particularly evident in the varying manners in which 
different groups and individuals might respond to place names being re-examined 
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and changed, where personal and collective naming and story-telling, memory and 
authority, and history weave together into never a singular, but always a multi-
“historiographic invocation” (Benjamin in Cohen 1998:3). Phenomenologically and 
inter-subjectively, “there is never a landscape, always many landscapes” to consider 
(Bender 1998:25). They are multiple and contradictory, they work on different scales 
and are reconstructed and re-appropriated over and over again (Bender 1998). They 
may also overlap, according to different discourses and communities. 
Landscape is not passive, not ‘out-there’, because people create their 
sense of identity, - whether self, or group, or nation-state – through 
engaging and re-engaging, appropriating and contestating the 
sedimented pasts that make up the landscape (Bender 1998:25). 
“As a physical and multi-sensory medium, in which cultural meanings and values are 
encoded” (Mitchell 1994:14), landscape can be viewed as a socio-cultural 
construction always to be examined from varying positions. These positions might 
include the meanings of the landscape. It may also comprise of the landscape of 
memory (represented by the colonial map in which landscape is given value by its 
place in history, where place-names record the actions of human agents who played 
a role in transforming the country) and the landscape as memory (where the place-
names refer to ancestral action with the capacity to reproduce the present in the 
form of the past) (Bender 1993:14). For the purposes of this investigation, it is vital 
to regard a key position, namely the textuality of the landscape or the landscape as 
inscribed surface.  
 
In returning to a discussion around representation and landscape, we find that on the 
one hand in prehistoric and non-Western art, place is rarely depicted in terms of an 
outward appearance. Rather, it is presented as an impression, feel, significance or 
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meaning, with place consequently experienced from the inside (Thomas in Bender 
1993:21). On the other hand, we find that Western art history has since the 
Renaissance been dominated by an urgency to portray the world as realistically as 
possible. It can be argued that as part of this action, a certain amount of “fixing” 
occurs, with a resultant “freezing” of place as seen from a particular point of view.  
 
The emergence of landscape art is directly associated with the development of linear 
perspective (Cosgrove 1984), allowing painters to represent a three-dimensional 
world on a two-dimensional surface by sorting out represented objects in relation to 
another. The technique of perspective was regarded to be a means of revealing the 
truth (and not as an artifice). Additionally, perspective art was seen to represent a 
manner of visual control, which allowed for the “fixing” of time and a presentation of 
things as they empirically appear to be. Apart from instituting spatial relations on the 
two-dimensionality of surfaces, perspective also established a fixed relationship 
between object and subject, locating the viewer outside of the picture and also 
outside of the relationship portrayed. Thus the viewer is rendered transcendental, 
outside of history, with landscape painting serving as “a representation of a place 
which alienates land, such as it can be appropriated by a gaze which looks in from 
outside” (Thomas in Bender 1993:21). As such, vision is privileged over the other 
senses, an inclination recognisable in other practices that associated consciousness 
with vision, such as in Renaissance cartography and theatre, and also later in 
Cartesian philosophy. 
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Figure 13: 
Illustration of the Cartesian theory of the retinal image 
 
The supremacy of vision in our knowing and thinking about the world, or 
ocularcentrism, follows the Cartesian notion of a disembodied and rational eye as an 
instrument of order and control. Descartes was perhaps the first to lay the 
foundations for the modern inquiry into the visual as a main source of human 
experience and knowledge (Descartes 1970). By claiming that truth is only found in 
what one could see with one’s eyes, he equated sight with an objective and accurate 
way of discovering the external world of which images served as tangible and 
recordable evidence (evidence from Latin videre “to see”, “observe”, “understand”). 
Knowing through seeing, in Descartes’ understanding, was “knowing through staring” 
(Jay 1993a), that is via an immobile, fixed gaze which examined objects always from 
a distance. Such passive intellectual engagement with the object of knowledge 
complemented by a physical detachment from it gave rationale to a clear-cut 
distinction between the body and the outside world, the seer and the seen. In terms 
of the stone texts on hills and its colonial history, we find a clear illustration of this 
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ideology of dominance; although passers-by are able to “read” the texts, it is easily 
viewed as an experience limited to a disembodied and passive “staring at” the text. 
There lies a power in the distancing of text from stone, not only dividing the seer 
from the seen but also in epistemologically implying a distance between the “literate” 
passer-by and the historically “illiterate” producer of text.  
 
There are two consequences to Cartesian perspectivalism. One is what Jay termed 
the “modern epistemological habit of ‘seeing’ ideas in the mind” (1993a:70). 
Descartes did not imagine ideas to be mere sensory reflections of the material world; 
in his famous epoché, it was the reasoning process and not empirical evidence that 
he found undoubtable. The other consequence, of particular importance to visual 
sociologists, is the “legitimating mode of scientific investigation through visual 
observation of evidence” (Jay 1993a:70). Going back to the Greeks, Jay notes the 
identification of the mind’s eye with “speculation” and binocular vision of two eyes 
with “observation” (1993a:29). As visual sociologists we thus engage in a distinctly 
Cartesian project: treating the visually observed world (including photographs, 
landscape art and other representations facilitated by instrumentation) as empirical 
evidence from which we deduce such mental constructs as social relationships and 
speculate on their meaning.  
 
Returning to landscape art, we find that distance and position raises a particular idea 
of the world but that it is simultaneously denied; the view is taken as “universal”, 
taking in everything as a homogenising whole. Given that landscape art presents the 
world from the point of view of the outsider, that which is inside the frame takes on 
the passive role of object to be manipulated, represented. The “object” is alienated 
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and deprived of an agency of its own, it is “laid bare” to the eye, to be surveyed at 
will (see figure 14).  
 
 
Figure 14: 
Albrecht Dürer 
Draughtsman Drawing a Nude 
1525 
Woodcut 
 
It can be assumed that a manner of looking automatically implies a politics of vision 
as can be found in the way in which land is looked upon as disengaged commodity, 
able to be sold, bought or claimed at will. In their direct implication of another, 
landscape painting and the idea of landscape are found to materialise in extension of 
capitalism (Bender 1993).  
 
Ocularcentrism deems that we live in a “specular civilisation” (Thomas in Bender 
1993:22). The prioritisation of vision is to be found in all areas of life. In a discussion 
on the emergence of the modern prison and the politics of vision, and as a metaphor 
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for state power in the modern era, Foucault makes reference to Jeremy Bentham’s 
Panopticon. As a “laboratory of discipline” (ibid), the Panopticon7 functioned as a 
never-ending surveillance machine, its design guaranteeing that no prisoner ever see 
the overseer conducting surveillance from the privileged central location within the 
radial configuration of the prison. The prisoner could never know when he was being 
surveilled, allowing for a kind of psychological uncertainty that in itself would prove 
to be a crucial instrument of discipline. The chief consequence of the Panopticon was 
to cause in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assured the 
automatic functioning of power, rending the actual exercise of power needless. 
Bentham laid down the standard that power should be visible and unverifiable: 
visible in the sense that the inmate will always have before his eyes the tall outline of 
the central tower from which he is spied upon, and unverifiable in that the inmate 
must never know whether he is being looked at but must be sure that he may always 
be seen (Foucault 1977). 
The Panopticon is a machine for dissociating the see/being seen dyad: in 
the peripheric ring, one is totally seen, without ever seeing; in the central 
tower, one sees everything without ever being seen (Foucault 1977:201). 
Ford (1991) argues that we use the medium of the scopophilic8 (Mulvey 1989:16) 
gaze to characteristically look at landscape and to characteristically represent place, 
be it via satellite image, map, aerial photograph, or GIS; they all function as 
particularly “specular”. It is the seeing and recording of the landscape, and the 
communication of that vision to other colonists - particularly through surveyor 
reports and maps - which historically converted the land from “unknown” to a 
something that can form part of the colonial process of knowledge via description. 
 
                                           
7 “All-seeing” 
8 Mastering the world visually, or turning persons into objects 
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The custom of representing place and land through mapping and image making 
consequently entails an obvious link to the consideration of landscape itself as 
inscribed surface. In the framework of description9, the act of mapping involves the 
inscription of the world on a surface (Alpers 1983:136). In the case of the South 
African stone inscriptions, the landscape is a surface capable of being inscribed. It is 
in the context of this process of inscription and interpretation that our experience of 
landscape can be most usefully analysed in terms of our experience of a text. As a 
dynamic and multifaceted approach to our understanding of landscape, it can be 
argued that landscape is read and written by groups and individuals like a book 
(Marston & Knox 2004:237). In conceptualising the landscape as text, we find a shift 
away from conventional attempts to systematise or categorise landscapes based on 
the different elements they might contain. The view of landscape-as-text holds that 
landscapes do not come with ready-made labels on them; rather there are “writers” 
who construct landscapes and their meaning, and “readers” who consume the 
messages embedded in landscape. These embedded messages can be read as signs 
about practices, beliefs or values, and just as people differ in their interpretation of a 
passage in a book, so different messages will be taken from particular landscapes. As 
a text, landscape both produces and communicates meaning. Ricoeur (1971) argues 
that the model of the text serves as a fine paradigm of social science, and one to 
which the methods of textual interpretation are relevant. Barnes and Duncan 
(1992:6) suggest that his model for analysing social life as a text is also applicable to 
landscape. Ricoeur recognises four key characteristics of written discourse, which he 
uses to examine social action. These are that meaning in written texts becomes 
concretised when it is inscribed, that the text inevitably exceeds the intentions of its 
author, that the text is often more important than its immediate context and is 
                                           
9 See chapter 5 for a brief investigation of the Dutch seventeenth century understanding of description and 
cartography. 
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interpreted and re-interpreted differently according to varying circumstances, and 
finally that the meaning of a text is unstable, depending to a large extent on the 
interpretations of its readers. 
In this sense, the metaphor of social-life-as-text is easily applied to an investigation 
of landscape and is characterised by all those features that Ricoeur identifies as 
definitive of a text. It too is culturally and socially produced. Landscape has a 
comparable objective fixity to that of a written text in that it also becomes detached 
from the aims of its original authors. Also, in terms of social and psychological 
impact and material consequences, the different readings of landscape will matter 
more than any authoritarian intentions. Additionally, landscape carries significance 
beyond the original situation for which it was constructed, always addressing a 
potentially endless range of readers (Barnes and Duncan 1992:6). Duncan and 
Barnes see landscape as characterised by all of these features, and suggest that 
“text” is  
an appropriate trope to use in analysing landscapes because it conveys 
the inherent instability of meaning, fragmentation or absence of integrity, 
lack of authorial control, polyvocality and irresolvable social contradictions 
that often characterise them (Barnes and Duncan 1992:7). 
Landscape shares these textual characteristics with writing, and our interpretations 
of real and written landscapes are inescapably caught up in the inter-textual 
relationships between them and our understanding of the conventions of each of 
them. These conventions and relationships are vital to the manner in which we can 
decode landscapes as textual systems, but in order to decipher them we have to 
primarily "trace the process by which landscape effaces its own readability and 
naturalizes itself" (Mitchell 1994:2). 
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We have already established that the body is always in place. Similarly, the human 
presence is always figured in the landscape. For that reason, the experience of 
“landscape as text” is always percolated through the experience of “landscape as 
environment”. In being visible, landscape "has the effect of making invisible the 
operations that made it possible", a veiling which "exhibits the (voracious) property 
that the geographical system has of being able to transform action into legibility", 
which in so doing "causes a way of being in the world to be forgotten" (Mitchell 
1994:2). At the same time, landscape is also caught up in systems of tradition and 
memory, both obscuring and encouraging its own legibility.  
 
Our experience of landscapes as textual systems forces us to consider landscapes as 
also bound up in narrative systems. Jameson believes that it is essential  
to restructure the problematics of ideology, of the unconscious and of 
desire, of representation, of history, and of cultural production, around 
the all-informing process of narrative [as] the central function or instance 
of the human mind (Jameson 1981:13). 
Moreover, it is necessary to remind ourselves that the narratives of landscape are 
multifaceted, as is the process by which we “read” them - a process which Barthes 
view as intrinsically political (Barnes and Duncan 1992). 
 
George Steiner defines a text as "something which was read with the intention of 
submitting a response" (Smith in Barnes and Duncan 1992:79). Likewise, he 
stipulates that "landscape becomes a text when the reader intends to respond" (ibid) 
Whether we intend to react or not, in Smith's terms, we nonetheless do respond to 
landscape on a variety of levels, including an interpretative level, even if we do not 
intend to structure that response in words. As Smith points out, not only do we 
interpret the landscapes we come across but also, "everywhere we look we 
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encounter a pre-interpreted landscape, or a landscape made legible" (Barnes and 
Duncan 1992:82). The reason for this might not only be because of the 
interpretations and constructions of others which have left their marks on the 
landscape, but also because we try to reach an understanding of every new 
landscape we come upon in the context of all of the other real, written, and 
represented landscapes we have already encountered. This is also true of our 
experience of text, as Jameson puts it,  
 we never really confront a text immediately, in all its freshness as a 
thing-in-itself. Rather, texts come before us as the always-already-read; 
we apprehend them through sedimented layers of previous 
interpretations, or - if the text is brand-new - through the sedimented 
reading habits and categories developed by those inherited interpretative 
traditions (1981:9). 
The stories we use in making sense of landscape will help to create and are 
structured around our sense of identity, this interrelationship permits us to obtain 
our “sense of place”. Our value judgements of landscape, like our appraisals of any 
text, are inevitably based on our temporal, geographical, cultural and social position; 
hence no representation of landscape of any particular historical period could ever be 
superior to another. Our interpretations of landscape are relative and disclose just as 
much about ourselves as they do about the landscape we are examining. In this 
sense, the production of meaning is complicated by the interpretative acts of the 
literal or metaphorical reader of landscape “texts”, be they written (for example in 
the format of a paragraph), represented (for example by photograph or painting), or 
actual (landscape itself). Roland Barthes holds that social reality is made up of 
multiple signifying systems of which landscape is merely one. These texts "should all 
be seen as signifying practices that are read, not passively, but, as it were, rewritten 
as they are read" (Barnes and Duncan 1992:5). The reader consequently becomes 
an essential connecting aspect between landscape and its representations, “re-
writing” his or her own concerns into both. It is imperative to regard how the "worlds 
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we represent" act upon and are altered by the medium in which they are 
represented, by the producer of that representation, and by the reader/viewer of the 
representation:   
given that when we write we do so from a necessarily local setting, the 
worlds we represent are inevitably stamped with our own particular set of 
local interests, views, standards and so on (Barnes and Duncan 1992:3).  
Associated with the use of the concept “text” is the notion of intertextuality where as 
landscape and place is constantly being negotiated and re-written, it is also being 
read and re-read. In this system places have become inter-textual sites, and by the 
same token new places can be viewed as “re-written old texts” (Hönnighausen in 
Benesch & Schmidt 2005:41).  
 
The notion of intertextuality — the proposal that every text produces meanings and 
structures by absorbing and transforming other texts, utterances, and sign systems 
— arrived on the scene of contemporary theory in the company of spatial metaphors. 
Consider Kristeva and Barthes: “the space of the text” (Kristeva 1980:69), “the 
volume of the social” (Barthes 1973:1015), “text places itself in the history” 
(Kristeva in Bakhtin & Holquist 1981:259), “the society inscribes itself in the text” 
(KRISTEVA 1980:65), and “all the texts of the space that has been read by the writer 
function in the paragram of the text” (Kristeva 1998:29). Numerous current and 
future terms could be supplemented to this inventory, consider Genette’s “hypertext” 
and “palimpsest”, Derrida’s “writing” and “trace”.  
 
The emphasis on the spatial, considered to be fundamental to the idea of 
intertextuality, was provoked by the polemic against time-honored notions of verbal 
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interaction that represented communication as the linear transmission of an 
information “package” from author to reader and backed by a monolithic common 
code. In contradistinction to such views, intertextuality, with its spatial models, 
suggests some conjectures with regards to the relationship between texts. Firstly, 
that every text is animated by an open dialogue producing a multifaceted and ever 
shifting network of inter-subjective relations and identity positions. And secondly, 
that semantic and structural patterns of the text, like tips of icebergs, lie on an vast 
sea of the implicit, on numerous layers of codes, utterances, and cultural 
representations. For this reason the patterns are dynamic, indeterminable, and 
subject to varied regimes of ascribing sense to linguistic data (Juvan 2004). In light 
of the spaces of intertextuality, it is possible to view intertextuality as a practice in 
which heterogeneous semiotic spaces are juxtaposed, transposed and merged - not 
only those spaces represented in the textual world but also those evoked by 
linguistic and genre forms on the textual surface.  
 
Barthes (1976:36) views the inter-text as “what comes to me, not what I summon 
up; not an “authority”, simply a circular memory. Which is what the inter-text is: the 
impossibility of living outside the infinite text”. The concern then is not that of 
“authority”, but rather that of “a circular memory” and of “the impossibility of living 
outside” of context. Immediately then, within this “infinite text”, we are able to find 
echoes between Barthes’ “impossibility of living outside the infinite text” and 
Derrida’s notion of “il n’y a pas de hors de texte”.  
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In Derrida’s approach “all that is, is text” and all is read as “text”. There is a text as 
soon as there is a “trace”, a reference from one trace to another distinct trace. Such 
references are never inert and traces are neither present nor absent. A text can 
consequently never be a closed system: it is a texture of traces, interwoven and 
interacting in mutual relation to each other. These traces are always in reference to 
something, which again is in reference to something as a trace. In this sense, texts 
are not limited to written texts. Derrida’s broad understanding of text implies that 
there is no perception of life and reality beyond text, including spoken discourse, 
action and ritual. By this understanding of “text” Derrida does not mean to create 
some sort of “text-centrism”, instead he emphasises that a text is not a centre but 
an open interplay of references without any restricting boundaries.  
 
With the conception of landscape as text that can be written and read, we are able to 
imagine a steady re-negotiation of meaning and reference into a constant re-writing 
and re-reading of the landscape as inter-textual. As “inter-textual site” 
(Hönnighausen in Benesch & Schmidt 2005:41), place forms part of this circular 
memory in which a singular authority is absent. Therefore, in Bender’s stipulation 
that “there is never a landscape, always many landscapes” (1998:25) we find that 
landscapes are written in a multiple and contradictory manner working on different 
scales and reconstructed and re-appropriated over and over again (Bender 1998). In 
this we find an overlap with other writings and readings, sometimes of the same 
text, sometimes of another.  
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In Barthes’ words, every text holds the inter-textual, itself being “the text-between” 
of another text and quite different to its “sources”, but nevertheless marking the 
“influences” and falling in with “the myth of filiation”, even whilst of and in citations 
that are “anonymous, untraceable and yet already read: they are quotations without 
inverted commas” (Barthes 1977:160). Inter-textuality is not just a recognition that 
one text informs another text, rather it is an acknowledgement that one text 
transforms another text, a transposition whereby: 
If one grants that every signifying practice is a field of transpositions of 
various signifying systems (an inter-textuality), then one understands 
that its “place” of enunciation and its denoted “object” are never single, 
complete, and identical to themselves, but always plural, shattered, 
capable of being tabulated (Kristeva 1984:60). 
Barthes writes that “the text is a productivity”, it is “the very theatre of a production 
where the producer of the text and the reader come together”, where “every text is 
an inter-text, a new tissue of recycled citations” (Orr 2003:33).  
 
Landscapes are palimpsests. As a term applied to ancient parchments that have been 
written on again and again but improperly erased between successive uses 
(McIlwraith 1997), landscapes as palimpsest are similarly implicated by change, 
comings-and-goings, accumulation, construction, reconstruction and breaking down. 
Landscape boundaries may be demarcated, then wiped away and reconstructed. 
Hence, in a stratigraphic chain, layers are written, erased, covered, rewritten. A 
palimpsest is never finalised, but implies a incessant readiness for modification or re-
appropriation. The notion of a landscape as palimpsest has been a root metaphor of 
archaeology; it connects both the past and the archaeological practice to the act of 
writing, with the landscape thus reading as “text” (Barthes 1987). One finds that the 
palimpsest is full of acts of iconoclasm through erasure, renderings, ruptures and 
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breaks with what came before, leaving traces that need to be sequenced by readers 
of that landscape into linear time. However, landscape (like time) is complex, 
transformational, disorderly and multiple: as a multi-temporal ensemble, landscape 
is full of once distant material pasts that are now proximate and, likewise, material 
pasts close in linear time may also seem quite distant. The past can be viewed as a 
medium of percolation, of seeping into the landscape, allowing the multi-temporality 
of landscape to be experienced as present (Whitmore 2005). In this sense landscape 
is to be read not only in stratigraphic order with focus on what is more recent or, for 
that matter, most distant. Instead, the intertextuality of landscape as palimpsest 
needs to be responded to: as never a “singular” landscape, always in overlap with 
other landscapes; past and present, and necessarily without a central author. 
 
Whitmore (2005) explains this by circumventing the expected temporal gaps or rifts 
of palimpsest found in the theory of percolation for the phenomenological notion of 
chiasma (see figure 15). Like a Möbius model, a “cross-piece” or a “cross-shaped 
mark” (Pearsall 2001), the chiasma refers to the crossing points of folds where 
various times (and spaces) come together, whether in the excavation of a possible 
burial site (digging where previously a hole had been made for a specific and 
meaningful purpose) or the finding of an ancient implement in a modern setting (for 
example, finding a stone tool washed out onto the concrete slopes of the Apies 
river). We are able to return to the past via our chiasmic relation to the present: we 
are now able to return to then. One is not only able to read and respond to the stone 
text in a contemporary setting, rather there is an overlapping between how it is read 
in the present, how and why it had been produced (written) in the past, and in our 
approach to its meaning: the “past time” is still present and tangible in all its layers, 
but at the same time is also interpreted and discussed from a current viewpoint. It is 
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precisely in acknowledgement of the “current” that Bender (1998) refers to Williams’ 
(1973) “structure of feeling”. Landscape, instead of merely embodying traces of 
people’s past activities, also represents a sense of “being in” rather than merely 
“looking at” landscape, thereby losing its overly referential faculty. By meshing 
Williams’ position with a more phenomenological approach to landscape, we can 
“move beyond mere descriptions of land-use, or legitimizing and homogenizing 
myths of origin, to explorations of tensioned and contradictory processes and 
experiences – both past and present” (Bender 1998:28). The past is omnipresent in 
the landscape we inhabit. Olivier (2001:67) went as far as asserting that 
Right now, the present here is made up of a series of past durations that 
makes the present multi-temporal. The past is in the present, it is mainly 
the present. What will remain from this present instant is possibly an 
imperceptible layer of things, deposited on the surface of a huge 
accumulation of past temporalities, some of them relating to the most 
remote pasts: in the fields around, beside motorways and supermarkets, 
flakes of flint tools show through the surface, together with fossilised 
shells; down by the river, dark waters silently roll over rocks that came 
here millions of years ago. The present here is this imperceptible and 
continual process of increasing the unbelievable mass of the past. 
 
Figure 15: 
The Möbius strip. 
 
In The Visible and the Invisible (1968), Merleau-Ponty uses the term chiasm to relate 
to his theories of the lived experience, to touching and being touched; he refers to 
the chiasm between various senses as a cohesive perceptual intertwining of human 
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flesh and the flesh of the world. He argues that mind and body (1968:247, 259), the 
perceptual faith and its articulation (1968:93), subject and object, self and world 
(1968:123), as well as many other associated dualisms, are all related chiasmically, 
and he terms the interdependence of these various different notions: the Flesh 
(1968:248-51). We could argue that the bodily engagement with the world occurs on 
the border between body and its surroundings, at its margins. Flesh is not a 
substance in-between the body and the world but is to be understood  
functionally, as texture, articulation, framework, joints, as an element in 
which we live and move. . . . An intertwining that forms between things, 
others and myself, a chiasmus or a chiasma . . . [where] [w]hat is one’s 
own and what is not, constantly more or less overlap but never entirely 
coincide with each other (Waldenfels 1998:288-289). 
 
Merleau-Ponty proposes that the awareness of the world as not simply an object: 
does not mean that there was a fusion or coinciding of me with it: on the 
contrary, this occurs because a sort of dehiscence opens my body in two, 
and because between my body looked at and my body looking, my body 
touched and my body touching, there is overlapping or encroachment, so 
that we may say that the things pass into us, as well as we into the things 
(1968:123).  
 
According to Merleau-Ponty, then, this non-dualistic divergence between touching 
and being touched, which necessitates some form of encroachment between the two 
terms, also means that the world is capable of encroaching upon and changing us, 
just as we are capable of altering it. Such an ontology rejects any absolute 
opposition between self and world, as well as any notion of subjectivity that 
prioritises a rational, autonomous individual who is capable of imposing their choice 
upon a situation that is entirely external to them. Body and world, like past and 
present, he insists, are "interwoven" in such a way that seemingly neat conceptual 
distinctions between them are bound to distort and misrepresent the phenomena as 
we actually live and understand them in pre-conceptual, pre-reflective, pre-articulate 
ways. Carbone (2004) asks, 
 58 
What in fact does simultaneity indicate, if not the chiasm of presence and 
absence sketched by the relation between visible and invisible? And how, 
then, does the relation . . . between the sedimented presence of the 
instituted element and the latency of possibilities of the instituting 
element appear, except as the chiasmic relation between visible and 
invisible?  
In response to the Cartesian notion of a disembodied and rational eye as an 
instrument of order and control, Merleau-Ponty’s (1964, 1968, 1993a, 1993b) 
phenomenology proposes an expanded conception of vision as a deeply embodied 
and pre-reflective involvement with the surrounding world where all senses 
intertwine, rather than form a hierarchy, to create a lived-out experience. His 
outlook on vision as an embodied involvement with the world, is characterised not by 
a superficial surveying of the distant objects but by a fundamentally reversible 
relation between the seer and the seen, the visible and the invisible, where the visual 
encounter becomes an intertwining of all sensory perceptions that experience the 
world in its pre-reflective rawness (Merleau-Ponty 1968; 1993b). In his 
understanding, it is the body that looks, not the eye or the mind.  
 
Merleau-Ponty argues that more than anything we are carnal beings who move 
around, smell, touch and hear, so that every visual contact with the world becomes a 
lived-out not thought-out experience of it. This makes us embodied “agent[s]-at-
grips-with-things” (Taylor 1989:7) who make sense of the world by acting in and on 
it. Our perception is always conditioned by our stance in space, our movement 
towards or away from the subject. 
 
In a dialogue regarding the chiasmic relation between things, Serres (in Serres & 
Latour 1995:60) explains:  
If you take a handkerchief and spread it out in order to iron it, you can 
see in it certain fixed distances and proximities. If you sketch a circle in 
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one area, you can mark out nearby points and measure far-off distances. 
Then take the same handkerchief and crumple it, by putting it in your 
pocket. Two distant points suddenly are close, even superimposed. If, 
further, you tear it in certain places, two points that were close can 
become very distant . . . . As we experience time . . . it resembles this 
crumpled version much more than the flat, overly simplified one.  
Being made of the same stuff, body and the world are part of flesh. The thickness of 
flesh between the seer and the thing is as constitutive for the thing of its visibility as 
for the seer of his corporeity (to be of physical body); it is not an obstacle between 
them, it is their means of communication (Merleau-Ponty 1968:135).  
 
In viewing koppies bearing chalk inscriptions as part of the landscape as palimpsest, 
I am interested in whether this could be read as a kind of text (stone inscription on 
koppie) on text (landscape as text). The inscribed word or mark thereby functions as 
a footnote or an “aside” in the interpretation of the landscape, which, as I have 
argued, is already text. As an expository addendum to the text, an annotation and a 
reference, the footnote comments on part of the main body of text. As footnotes, the 
landscape inscriptions can be viewed as literalisations of the landscape as text. As a 
textual refererence to text, it can be argued that these inscriptions serve to 
contribute to, affirm and complicate the reading of the landscape. As literal textual 
references these inscriptions reveal the non-literal textual nature of the landscape, at 
the same time confirming that we are already in a state of reading the landscape as 
text.  
 
The inscription or writing of text (using stone as marker) onto land takes place in a 
performative manner. In this performance, the body takes the place of the hand in 
writing. Notions of proximity come into play as the body is consumed by the size of 
the text whilst writing/installing and therefore requires a distance in order to activate 
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legibility; the interplay between subjectivity (performance) and objectivity (reading) 
becomes a literalised performance in itself. 
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4.  The Sensory Perception of Passage: Footnotes, Distances and the 
Immediacy of Experience 
 
So what one has is the observer travelling. . . .10 . 
John Cleever (Dyer 2005:33) 
 
Space . . . exists in a social sense only for activity – for (and by virtue of) walking . . .or travelling.  
 
Henri Lefebvre (Bruno 2007:15) 
a. The Moving Eye 
Our experience of landscape is inexplicably tied to movement; in fact the movement 
of the body and the world is seen as a pre-requisite for life as it happens in places 
(Casey 1993). A consideration of motility, be it in vehicular or pedestrian manner, 
makes necessary a reflection on spatiality. In opposing the Kantian notion of space 
as a pure space "in the mind", Merleau-Ponty argues for a spatiality that is 
essentially associated with the "lived-body”, the kinaesthetic body embedded in 
spatiality and action. In this manner, the lived-body stands as an active partner to 
spatiality and that “to be a body, is to be tied to a certain world; our body is not 
primarily in space: it is of it" (Merleau-Ponty 1962:267). However, to be "of space" is 
to also be an active collaborator in its creation. Merleau-Ponty thus unites spatiality 
and motility inasmuch as space and our facility to move are indivisible. To Merleau-
Ponty movement is a displacement or modification of positions in terms of the 
relationships in objective space (1962:267). In essence, I know my movement 
without my being aware of its objective position; there is no movement without the 
moving body. 
                                           
10 The complete sentence in Dyer’s book The Ongoing Moment is “So what one has is the observer 
travelling on a train” (Dyer 2005:33). 
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Each voluntary movement takes place in a setting, against a background 
which is determined by the movement itself. . . . We perform our 
movement in a space which is not "empty" or unrelated to them, but 
which on the contrary, bears a highly determinate relation to them: 
movement and background are, in fact, only artificially separated stages 
of totality (Merleau-Ponty 1962:137-38). 
Likewise, one is able to recognise an object or its size immediately without any 
contemplation (Merleau-Ponty 1962:268). The spatiality of the body becomes the 
internal space of my body, via the spatiality of position and situation. In addition, the 
“spatiality of thing” and the “being as a thing” are both categories of "bodily 
space"11. This re-affirms the immediacy between our bodies and space in non-
reductive active relation; body and space are interconnected. In the same way, he 
continues, 
space and time are not, for me, a connection of adjacent points nor are 
they a limitless number of relations synthesized by my consciousness, I 
am not in space and time, I do not conceive space and time: I belong to 
them, my body combines with them and includes them. The scope of this 
inclusion is the measure of that of my existence (Merleau-Ponty 
1962:140).  
On the corporeality of practice in relation to space-time, Casey (1993, 1997) 
maintains that the locatedness of the body accentuates the “place character” of 
space. The body is always in place, notwithstanding any developments of notions 
such as “placelessness”, “disembeddedness” and mobility: even if we are moving or 
in a state of flux, we are doing so from a position of emplacement. We cannot escape 
this fact (Simonsen & Baerenholdt 2004:48). Similarly, we cannot escape the reality 
that the body itself is spatial; Merleau-Ponty states that the spatiality of the body is 
not a spatiality of position but of situation. This can be applied to temporality as well: 
                                           
11 Merleau-Ponty, in contrast to the Cartesian "cogito", views consciousness, the world, and the human 
body as a perceiving thing that are intricately intertwined and mutually `engaged'. The phenomenal thing 
is not the unchanging object of the natural sciences but a correlate of our body and its sensory functions.  
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we should not imagine our bodies as merely in space or in time, but rather consider 
that our bodies inhabit space and time. The “moving body” positions the world 
around itself and constitutes that world as “ready-to-hand” (Heidegger 1962:83); it 
is a “measuring” of space and time in its dynamic production of the meaningful world 
(Simonsen & Baerenholdt 2004:48). 
 
Lefebvre (1991:61) contributes to this key argument by means of a strong accent on 
social practice and the production of space as consisting of “a practical and fleshy 
body conceived of as totality complete with spatial qualities (symmetries, 
asymmetries) and energetic properties (discharges, economies, waste)”. Each living 
body is and has its space. It produces itself in space at the same time as producing 
that space; this is a vital precondition to the material production. Both Lefebvre and 
Merleau-Ponty highlight the vital role of the body in “lived experience”. It comprises 
a practico-sensory realm that allows for an observation of space via sensory 
experience. In this manner the body constructs a space that is both anthropological 
and biomorphic in nature, and a relationship between the body and its environment 
is assembled via a “double process of orientation and demarcation” (Simonsen & 
Baerenholdt 2004:49), functioning in a symbolic and practical manner. Lefebvre 
maintains that these processes are linked in a formation of the “spatial body”: 
A body so conceived, as produced and as the production of space, is 
immediately subject to the determinants of that space . . . the spatial 
body’s material character derives from space, from the energy that is 
deployed and put to use there (Lefebvre 1991:195). 
Clearly, there is a necessary relationship between body, practice and time-space. 
The relation of “body-subjects” with space is never one of simple location (Simonsen 
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& Baerenholdt 2004:49) but of active engagement with the surrounding world 
involving a production of meaning. 
 
De Certeau presents an account on the value of the “moving body” through the 
metaphor of “walking the city”’ as having its own logic, its own rhetoric. In his essay, 
“Walking the City”, he describes the experience of observing Manhattan from atop 
the World Trade Center. New York City unfolds below him like a panorama. His 
vantage point flattens the city into geometric patterns devoid of human activity as 
the city appears planned and rationally organised. This calls a spatial fair and square 
logic in which the scale of justice is equivalent to the scale of measurement used to 
equate two different entities in quantitative terms.  
A city composed of paroxysmal places in monumental reliefs. The 
spectator can read in it a universe that is constantly exploding. In it are 
inscribed the architectural features of the coincidatio oppositorum 
formerly drawn in miniatures and mystical textures. On this stage of 
concrete steel and glass, cut out between two oceans (the Atlantic and 
the American) by a frigid body of water, the tallest letters in the world 
compose a gigantic rhetoric of excess in both expenditure and production 
(de Certeau [1984b] in During 1994: 52). 
In being lifted to a summit, in being transformed into a voyeur, distanced from the 
mass below and looking down like a god over all surveyed, de Certeau believes the 
city is transformed into a text that can be read. This totalising eye which claims to 
know the city, this voyeur-god, de Certeau (1984a:93) tells us “must disentangle 
himself from the murky intertwining daily behaviours” of the ordinary practitioners of 
the city down below where they walk with a knowledge of the city that cannot be 
seen. In other words, the “everyday” escapes the imaginary totalisations produced 
by the panoptic eye, as the pedestrians moving down below create their world 
through their journeys and in accordance with their customs and practices. They are 
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following the urban pathways but at the same time are producing their own stories, 
shaped out of the fragments of routes and the alterations of spaces. This entails a 
process which combines narration and walking in which a mobilisation of meanings 
can be seen. The onlooker standing atop the World Trade Centre might remain 
"foreign" to the inhabited world below, but those who walk the streets become active 
participants. Though individually "illegible", the aggregate of many such movements 
constitutes the story of urban life:  
The networks of these moving, intersecting writings compose a manifold 
story that has neither author nor spectator, shaped out of fragments of 
trajectories and alterations of spaces: in relation to representations, it 
remains daily and indefinitely other (During 1994:153). 
Such uncoordinated movements, de Certeau argues, can not be adequately 
expressed through abstractions, whether those of the artist or the urban planner: 
Their story begins on ground level, with footsteps. They are myriad, but 
do not compose a series. They cannot be counted because each unit has a 
qualitative character: a style of tactile apprehension and kinaesthetic 
appropriation. Their swarming mass is an innumerable collection of 
singularities (de Certeau 1984a:97). 
De Certeau argues for a sociology that respects these "singularities" rather than 
searching for a totalising account. Here, places emerge not out of the sites of rooted 
dwelling as they are imagined in the Heideggerian tradition; instead they appear 
through kinds of boundary transgressions and the presence of “open places” which 
are available to be appropriated and where people can find common ground.  
 
With reference to Merleau-Ponty, de Certeau [1984b] writes:  
These practices of space refer to a specific form of operations (‘ways of 
operating’), to ‘another spatiality (an ‘anthropological’, poetic and mythic 
experience of space), and to an opaque and blind mobility characteristic 
of the bustling city. A migrational, or metaphorical city thus slips into the 
clear text of the planned and readable city (in During 1994:154). 
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De Certeau thus views “walking the city” as one of these everyday practices or “ways 
of operating” that allows ordinary people to move in a network of already existing 
forces and representations. It is a spatial practice utilising the urban system in a 
manner that influences the conditions of urban life. In acknowledgment of both 
Merleau-Ponty and Lefebvre, de Certeau believes the city to be a “lived space”, 
where walking gives shape to spaces, uniting places and producing a diversity of 
subsystems whose existence in some sense makes up the city. The walker 
constitutes a location, a “here and there”, thus establishing a conjunctive and 
disjunctive articulation of place. Walking is a space of “enunciation”, in this sense 
having a triple function: of appropriation (of the urban topographical system), of 
spatial realisation, and its implication of relations among separate positions in the 
form of movement (Simonsen & Baerenholdt 2004:50).  
 
With de Certeau’s model of the city as backdrop, one is faced with different scales of 
looking or viewing: firstly that of the panoptic or totalising view (the city seen from 
above like a map), and secondly the singularity of experience on street-level 
(walking the city in a state of immediacy). It is important, though, to note that in 
discussing the South African phenomenon of marked hills, and when faced with 
inscribed examples in the form of texts in the landscape, that one is predominantly 
dealing with an additional and third scale of looking: that of the vehicular and 
distanced view of the passer-by travelling by train or car through the landscape, 
whether as passenger or as driver. In this sense, vehicular travel implies a clear line 
of advance and departure in the form of clearly marked and followed routes – in the 
form of roads or the railway line - relying on a predetermined mapping of approach. 
Even though a vehicular and distanced scale of viewing is reminiscent of de Certeau’s 
panoptic and elevated view of the city as it shares a panoramic mode of distancing 
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and non-immediacy – in comparison to the immediacy found in the singularity of the 
walking experience – the third scale of viewing is very different too as it includes a 
view of the landscape in motion.  
 
In explaining how the railway or automobile ensemble imposes a particular form of 
distanced vision upon the traveller, Schivelbusch suggests that the speed at which 
the car or train moves and the “mathematical directness” of the route dissolve the 
direct sensual relationship of the traveller to the travelled space (Smith 2001:129). 
Fore-grounded space cannot be absorbed visually. For this reason, the traveller loses 
connection with proximate space, focusing instead on distant space. This distant 
space moves by in a “series of . . . pictures or scenes created by the continuously 
changing perspective” (Schivelbusch 1977:64). In effect, “the traveller sees the 
objects, landscape, etc. through the apparatus which moves him through the world”, 
with the effect that “evanescent reality has become the new reality” (Schivelbusch 
1977:64). However, it is vital to note that the evanescent view also functions 
paradoxically as a fixed scene. As Leed suggests, in a discussion on the passage 
through space and the relationship between a point of disappearance or an aiming 
point, “the motion of the traveller super-imposes a pattern of outflow and inflow 
upon an environment” and from this the traveller obtains an “idea of an objective 
world, of that which does not change as one changes” (Leed 1991:75). In a sense, 
the evanescent view functions as fourth wall, separating and linking the viewer from 
the action in the landscape. To add to this there seems to exist a sense in the 
passing observer that everything on the outside is always rushing towards you, 
“through” you, with elements on the horizon (such as text) serving as the only 
momentary “fixed” points of reference on the outside. In this way the South African 
phenomenon of marked hills serve as simple targets for the eye to trace its 
 68 
movement through the landscape, reminding us of the simple childhood act of 
following a mark in the landscape along its route through the car window. In addition 
to being markers, however, these inscriptions constitute a textual instruction or 
message that not only allows for a marking of horizon but also impose a specific 
reading of landscape as text. To travel through the landscape in this manner, 
therefore, implies a reading of the landscape through markers, in this case clearly 
textualised markers. Travelling, in other words, entails an act of reading, with the 
journey or passage through the landscape implying a landscape – or passage - that 
is “never stopping”, with the texts on the passing hills to be read as footnotes in the 
continuum of the landscape as text. 
 
De Certeau interprets the phenomenology of train travel (as is applicable to car 
travel) in post-modern terms; he holds that there are two sites of immobility put in 
relationship with one another in travelling through the landscape. On the inside of 
the vehicle (albeit car, train or motorcycle helmet), de Certeau suggests, 
only a rationalized cell travels. A bubble of panoptic and classifying 
power, a module of imprisonment that makes possible the production of 
an order, a closed and autonomous insularity – that is what can traverse 
space and make itself independent of local roots” (de Certeau 
1984a:111). 
The world outside reveals another kind of immobility, “that of things, towering 
mountains, stretches of green field and forest, arrested villages and colonnades of 
buildings” (ibid). Hence, there are two locations of immobility, firstly relating to the 
fixedness of the geographical space through which the traveller moves, and secondly 
to the fixedness of “rationalised cell” passing through space. Because “vision alone 
continually undoes and remakes the relationships between these fixed elements” (de 
Certeau 1984a:112), only the eye (and I infer, also the window frame) lies between 
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the immobility of the inside and outside. “Transporting” the eye, as it were, is the 
machine, the primum mobile (de Certeau 1984a:113). The practice of continuous 
motion through the landscape in return:  
resolves boundaries into paths, makes thresholds into perceptual tunnels 
of continuously evolving appearances, coverts limits into avenues. 
Passage, in short, dissolves the realities inseparable from place: the 
reality of boundaries, the recurrences of time and morality, all inherent 
containments with the defining and confining orders of place (Leed 
1991:79). 
On the relation between rest and motion, Husserl (Kockelmans and Kisiel 1970:39) 
remarks that motion is experienced as relative to some ground-body experienced as 
stationary in relation to the body. However, this ground-body is itself experienced to 
be at rest, against the background of the world, which itself is not experienced as an 
objectifiable body. 
I can be in a car which in relation to my body is experienced to be at rest. 
But when I look out, I say that the car is moving, even though what I 
actually see is the landscape moving past my car. The train next to mine 
appears to be moving, until I glance at the railroad bed and see that it is 
really my train that is in motion.  The reversal between rest and motion 
are based on the earth as ground, itself experienced not as a body, but as 
a horizon at absolute rest . . .  (Husserl in Kockelmans and Kisiel 
1970:39). 
In light of the mobile viewer, it is no coincidence that the railways and photographic 
representation – perhaps the nineteenth century’s two most cunning means of social 
spatialisation – developed a commanding and long-lasting relationship. Both were 
fresh technologies that lent themselves to the projects of modern governance and 
nation building. Photography was not only a fundamental component to the 
topographical surveys for the construction of new railway lines (Petro 1995), but also 
later an ideal means for supporting the development that would guarantee 
economically feasible traffic levels on them via promotion through photographic 
views. Photography’s apparent accuracy and clarity made it a palpable form of 
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representation for corporations founded on modernity and technology, with the 
medium’s reproducibility making it an ideal means for engaging the emergent middle 
class’ interest in and desire to travel to new places. Both photography and the 
railways dealt with the ordering and regulation of time and space. Accordingly both 
operated as important tools in the definition of new political territories, especially in 
the colonies, where the relation between photography and the railways served to 
represent imperial progress and unity (Foster in Schwartz & Ryan 2003:141). 
 
In the case of South Africa, one observes a growth in the relationship between the 
railways, photography and nation building at the beginning of the twentieth century, 
with the South African Railways and Harbours (SAR&H) actively employed by the 
Union of South Africa as an instrument of nation building. As the largest employer in 
the sub-continent and in large measure accountable for the encouragement of 
settlement, investment and tourism in South Africa, the SAR&H also served as the 
main commissioner, publisher and supplier of images of the country. According to 
Foster (Schwartz & Ryan 2003:142) this relationship and history suggests important 
questions about how  
photography facilitates the transformation of space on the ground into 
place in the mind, and suggests that this transformation is not a linear, 
irreversible process, but rather an iterative dialogue between the space of 
lived experience on the one hand, and the space constructed or 
suggested by representation on the other. 
 
In the conversation around representation in the modern era, a great deal has been 
made of how visual imagery and photography in particular have altered the 
geographical imagination: photography supports the development of a mental map 
that can be shared by many by evening out the confusions, deviations and 
contradictions of the world, licensing that which is picturable over that which is not. 
The aptitude of large groups of people to occupy the same subjectivity of attitude 
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towards a shared space relies heavily on visualisation, imagery rendering the 
imaginary space somehow comprehensible to all. It can further be argued that the 
discursive representation of imaginary spaces creates a sense of community and that 
the representations of place, if not actually serving as representations of identity, 
are, at the very least, commanding agents in the construction of that identity 
(Daniels 1990).  
 
In contrast to this view, we find the phenomenological view produced out of a 
“complete horizon of experience” (Foster in Schwartz & Ryan 2003:143) as not 
entirely intellectual, social or sensory but a mixture of all these, unfolding as a carnal 
subjectivity over time (Merleau-Ponty 1962:441). This kind of geographical 
imagination manifests itself as “a generalized, qualitative, embodied subjectivity 
toward (or a way of being in) the physical world” (Foster in Schwartz & Ryan 
2003:143). This conversation with a particular terrain is both practical and 
imaginative at the same time, and includes identification with the terrain and a 
projection of the self into that terrain by manner of a phenomenological “body-world 
dialectic”. How is it ever possible to reduce this kind of geographical imagining into a 
mental map? In this manner, place is to be viewed as a lived experience constantly 
reworked through metaphor, association and narrative. 
 
The Union of South Africa came into existence in 1910, facing “a state without a 
nation” (Beinart 1994), it was also a nation sporadically mapped and without 
definitive boundaries. At the time of the Union, maps of the region were based on a 
highly uneven collage of farm diagrams, railway surveys and military intelligence 
maps. Little detailed topographical information existed for large parts of the country 
(Liebenberg 1997:132). Before 1920, during the era of “New Imperialism”, the 
constitution of the Union of South Africa also left open the option for a yet larger 
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British South Africa to materialise, in which the original four provinces would be 
joined to the British Protectorates, Rhodesia and even the mandated South West 
Africa (Foster in Schwartz & Ryan 2003:323). Central to this imperial vision was a 
notion such as that held by Buchan (1903:129) that the “unpopulated” and 
temperate interior of South Africa had the potential to revitalise the “moral” and 
physical health of the metropolitan masses, in which immigrants to South Africa 
could enjoy a “classless” rural way of life. In this fashion, the South African interior 
had been culturally appropriated in the metropole as an exemplary imaginary realm 
and a remote region “just off the map” (Foster in Schwartz & Ryan 2003:148).  
It was also a terrain whose appeal was grounded in unmediated bodily 
experience which one might describe as preceding the map, the kind that 
afforded Europeans an exhilarating and reflexive sense of their own 
agency and ‘whiteness’ (ibid).  
 
It can be argued that colonial nationalist SAR&H administration utilised this liminal 
vision of South Africa, defining “South Africanism” in terms of a local vision of the 
South African landscape and the representation intended for both domestic and 
international viewers. Under such ambiguous representation, photography served as 
an ideal medium. However, a first-hand encounter with the terrain was necessary. Of 
course the medium’s accuracy and faculty for detail is noteworthy, but it is important 
to note that on many levels photography clearly lacks the ability to document the 
experiential dimensions of a terrain, the manner in which spaces unfold as one 
moves through it, or change in character over time. Significantly, it was the 
explorers themselves, not their audience, who were most aware of the way in which 
photography failed to reveal the “lie of the land” that was so unlike the European 
landscape (Schwartz & Ryan 2003:149). In this sense,  
the geographical imagination of ‘colonial nationalism’ owed as much to 
the embodied aestheticism of the traveler or explorer as it did to the 
distanced and rationalizing ‘gaze’ of the scientist, entrepreneur or 
administrator (ibid). 
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As a medium, photography became an instrument for the attempted experience of a 
national “lie of the land”. During a time when technology and modernity tended to 
take on ideological overtones, its use in exploring the inherent qualities of objects 
and landscapes suggested new possibilities for transcending and resolving the 
recurring colonial concern with the “gap between the name and the thing” (Carter 
1992:7). It can also be argued that the understanding of the “lie of the land” is 
produced by the nomadic, itinerant quality inherent to movement and travel; more 
specifically it can be said that different “lies of the land” are produced by different 
forms of travel, with the railways affecting the way in which people passed through 
the South African landscape at this time. As the SAR&H were encouraging people to 
travel, they were at the same time influencing their experiences along the way. As 
de Certeau (1984a:97) states:  
Surveys of routes miss what was: the act itself of passing-by. The 
operation of (moving through the landscape) is transformed into points 
that draw a totalizing and reversible line on the map… Itself visible, it has 
the effect of making invisible the operation which made it possible.  
 
Between 1910 and 1920 South African landscape photography experienced a shift in 
focus away from the a naïve celebration of the civilizing influence of colonialism to 
subjects ranging from identifiable signs of local interest, objects or features that 
could be named and placed or locations of historic interest. Occasionally these kind 
of images would be supplemented by photographs of picturesque European-like 
landscape scenes, reassuring a colonial population through “recognizable objects” 
and aiding in the establishment of a foothold in a new country (Carter 1992:45). In 
the 1920s these “recognisable objects” were to be substituted for a new variety of 
photographs portraying the European view of the South African regional landscape as 
anonymous, “unnamed” and “un-peopled”12, “unspoilt by the emblems of modernity” 
                                           
12 To describe the South African landscape at this time as ‘un-peopled’ is of course highly problematic; the 
Natives Land Act having been sanctioned in 1913. 
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(Foster in Schwartz & Ryan 2003:152). These images were often simply captioned as 
“the veld” (see figure 16) and proved to be integral in the development of a South 
African visual metaphor, still setting the pace today for many contemporary 
contemplations of South African landscape such as in the work of David Goldblatt 
(see figure 17). The similarity between the 1925 SAR&H photographic documentation 
of the veld and that of Foldboat’s Sheepfarm at Oubip between Aggenys and Loop 
10, Bushmanland, Northern Cape, 5 June 2004 is clear. In this diptych, the sun-
bleached landscape of the South African veld stretches unforgivingly and 
unchangingly. Devoid of an obvious composition with no clear focal point, they 
instead demand a meditation on texture and space. It is in this quality that we find a 
clear correspondence between these images and the SAR&H views of the veld. The 
strategy clearly relates to the way in which the early travellers viewed the inner 
landscapes of South Africa, especially the Karoo. Seen as featureless with nothing for 
the eye to settle on, these landscapes were typically considered as empty. In a 
contemporary response to the colonial notion of a mute and empty landscape, 
Goldblatt’s landscapes query these positions (De Waal 2005) by noting in somewhat 
hidden fashion the traces of human activity on the land: hidden among the bushes 
one finds a few sheep, some loose ends of human presence. These traces may be 
scarcely visible, or may have been immersed into the landscape itself, but they are 
there.  
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Figure 16: 
Unidentified photographer 
“The veld” 
Published in SAR&H July 1925. 
 
  
Figure 17: 
David Goldblatt 
Sheepfarm at Oubip between Aggenys and Loop 10, Bushmanland, Northern Cape, 5 June 2004 
2004 
Archival pigment on cotton rag paper 
Diptych 
Page size: 92 by 112 cm 
Image size; 84 by 105, 5 cm 
 
The representation of a landscape that is “empty” necessitated a transformation in 
both seeing and depiction. It calls for photographs that can organise “empty” 
landscapes in such a way that “the apparently vacant centre was revealed as part of 
a cohesive totality” (Foster in Schwartz & Ryan 2003:153). These photographs 
attempted to capture the unique relational qualities and characteristics of the 
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topography of the South African landscape, with particular focus on the interior and 
the open landscape.  
 
In conjunction with these views, another field of photo-based images emerged: the 
view from the train carriage window. Representing neither landscape nor train, but 
rather the effects of putting the two views side by side in a single image, these 
photographs usually appeared as separate items in the SAR&H Magazine, frequently 
without any accompanying text. Like the view that one has when traveling through 
the landscape by car, a narrative sequence is perceived. Foster (Schwartz & Ryan 
2003) maintains that this type of view, more than any other, embodied the intricate 
relationship of bodily knowledge, representational empiricism and discursive effect at 
work in the SAR&H photography at this time. These views carried a similar peculiar 
quality to those earlier synecdochic scenes of the veld as empty landscape, 
displaying no obvious economic or touristic cause and illustrating no reachable 
destination, instead implying a continuous landscape rolling past. It is when we 
examine them as investigative efforts at picturing a national “lie of the land”, and as 
accounts intended to negotiate the insinuation of gain and loss that sustained 
“colonial national” subjectivity, that these images become clear (Foster in Schwartz & 
Ryan 2003:153, 155).  
 
For the first time, all parts of the country had been collected into a specific temporal 
and spatial frame of reference. With all weather-roads generally only extending short 
distances beyond city or town limits13, train travel operated as the only feasible form 
of long-distance travel in South Africa until the 1930s. Like the photograph, the train 
                                           
13 The history of Gamkaskloof poses an interesting example of this phenomenon: no road existed into the 
Kloof until Otto du Plessis (Cape Provincial Administrator at the time) promised the inhabitants a road in 
the 1950s. The building of the road was started by the Roads Department under supervision of Koos van 
Zyl and was finished in 1962. Unluckily it had a detrimental effect on the “klowers” as they started to 
slowly drift away to the outside world. By 1990 there only remained three actively farming families in 
Gamkaskloof. 
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window framed the national terrain as something “seen”, as an observable fact that 
could be categorised and evaluated as a landscape. On a fundamental level it can be 
argued that the railway had detached the viewer from any direct bodily engagement 
with the landscape, as had been the case with animal–drawn transport (Dubow in 
Bender & Winer 2001:246), instead transferring the terrain into something distanced 
and panoramic (Schivelbusch 1977).  
 
In addition, as determined by the railway line, a unified national landscape following 
a single route had been made visible to a multitude of people, with the train journey 
described as a key to the understanding of the country and a move toward the 
development of a definition of what is typically South African. The idea of speed also 
serves a vital function in this process: due to the speed of previous modes of 
traveling through the landscape, it can be argued that the South African landscape 
had not been fully realised. At 80 kilometers per hour, train traveling allowed for a 
grasping of relational characteristics in the terrain. This emerged as an essential part 
of the narrative generated by movement, in turn establishing a new visualisation of 
the South African landscape. This new visible landscape was neither stationary nor a 
combination of separate sites, but ordered or “choreographed” (Schivelbush 1977) 
into “spatial presences and emptinesses that were part of one continuous imaginary 
realm” (Foster in Schwartz & Ryan 2003:155). This would have been unattainable 
without the synoptic unfolding vision activated through the train’s (and of course the 
passenger’s) movement across the landscape. In this manner, the photograph 
documenting the view from the train carriage window endeavored to make present 
some of the effects of train travel in relation to the experience of the landscape. 
Characteristically these views would be captured either from a compartment on the 
moving train or from the footplate of the rolling locomotive, framing the landscape in 
three steps: firstly by the photographer’s view-finder, secondly by the train window, 
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and thirdly by the train itself. The combination of train window and train movement 
link together the enclosed, secure train compartment with the great sweep of the 
landscape outside, the train window framing the curving form of the train and the 
train becoming a mediating device which affords the traveller a measure of an 
otherwise empty landscape (Foster in Schwartz & Ryan 2003:155) (see figure 18).  
 
Figure 18: 
Unidentified photographer 
View from a moving train in the Karoo, originally titled as “Through the Little Karoo”,  
Aangenaam valley 
1920 
 
Foster highlights a noteworthy “side-effect” to this type of view: that train travel (as 
with vehicular or car travel) accentuated the visible section of the landscape that was 
furthest away from the eye. This is precisely where the notion of the South African 
stone texts comes in: the distorted foregrounds and proximities of these views from 
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the train are separated from a more comfortably viewed middle and distant horizon, 
as they seem to pass more slowly in relation to the speed of the passing train. As 
part of the experiential realm, the landscape-as-horizon is reduced to its most 
elemental expression. In such scenes, the horizon represents a characteristic display 
of the landscape as a silhouetted figure against the sky. As the SAR&H Magazine 
(July 1929: 1147) noted: “ a railway carriage is nearly the only place where you can 
see, in perfect comfort, every kind of atmospheric effect over a broad expanse of 
changing country”. I would like to argue that it is precisely in the context of an 
accentuated and visible horizon that the applications of texts in the landscape are to 
be considered. Bearing in mind the “static” environments adjacent to these sites of 
textual inscription in the landscape, one is repeatedly made aware of the same 
elements: firstly, the inscribed text will almost always refer to a nearby locale or 
centre of human activity (like a town or place), either by means of a toponymic 
reference or some other text or symbol relating to a human description of the 
landscape; secondly, there is always some form of vehicular route close by, either in 
the form of a wagon road or service road, or the present-day freeway or national 
road; and thirdly, all of these inscriptions have a railway line passing by them. Of 
course, the inscription of landscape as surface is by no means a solely South African 
phenomenon and the tradition of marking the landscape can be traced back for 
centuries. Examples of chalked stone texts can be found globally, almost always in 
proximity to some form of human transportation (roads, railways, harbours or flight 
routes). The stone texts in the South African landscape - as found in other colonial 
and new political territories - possess a specific and close historic association to the 
railway line, not only in the manner in which they are read in the act of passing by, 
but also in that the specific quality of blurred foreground and more immobile horizon 
serve to create fertile ground for the inscription and the reading of these text as 
footnotes in a landscape generally perceived as a continuous text. 
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Transporting the empty veld and reverie-permeated space of the train compartment 
into a virtual alliance with one another, we can argue that these views from the train 
window encouraged a subjectivity ranging between that of the lone explorer and that 
of the armchair traveller. The views, in their framing (through the photograph, train 
window and the movement of the train through the landscape), commemorate the 
notion of mobility and mastery over circumstance, introducing an abstracted version 
of the embodied and sensory encounter with the terrain and concurrent sense of 
individual agency into the national discourse (Foster in Schwartz & Ryan 2003:160).  
 
As a seemingly comprehensive representation of the landscape, it can be said that 
these photographic views function similarly to that of a map pushing away into its 
prehistory the operations of which it is the result (de Certeau 1984a:121). But the 
effects go even further still: they rehearse a viewpoint and an opinion that also talks 
about an identity or way of being in the world: 
These photographs, through an iterative oscillation between ideological 
intention and experiential resonance, saved and transmitted the 
sensibility of one group and generation to those that followed, albeit in a 
transformed version (Foster in Schwartz & Ryan 2003:160).  
 
Where the railway uncovered the fundamental relational structure in the landscape, 
photography framed and brought the viewer “closer” to its material and sensory 
peculiarities, its vastness and so-called blankness, thus defining a national territory 
as a national topography (Schwartz & Ryan 2003). The construction of topography 
connects at the same time the act of describing a region and the “lie of the land”, 
emphasising the presence of humans in a landscape as an organization of that 
landscape and a subjectivity that makes description possible (Schwartz & Ryan 
2003). As Crary (1990:6) states: to observe something is to “conform one’s actions 
with it”.  
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On the topographical, let us compare this experience to the opposite of a fast 
traveling view of the landscape: the immediate, intimate and slower moving singular 
experience of walking the landscape. This was a particular landscape “beaten out by 
the footfall of travellers inflecting the patterns of the land as they went, or traversed 
by the wagon at each linking of the wheel” (Dubow in Bender & Winer 2001:247). 
Here the traveller is less a subject moving ahead between points than a body 
restoring itself to a world into which it is topologically working itself. In the 
immediacy of this experience, a “tactical initiative” (de Certeau 1984a) is employed 
in the body’s practical reply to its ground and a logic which “evinced by the path that 
needs veer around a bush or the route that bends to accommodate an obstructing 
stone, reveals the minute material act of passing by” (Dubow in Bender & Winer 
2001:248). 
 
The imaginative topographic space as fashioned by the moving eye marks the 
travellers’ heightened sense of the “lie of the land” and rehearses the subject-
position of the passer-by in an “empty” landscape. At the same time, these views 
convey the experiential moments of the past, implying a body-subject relation 
caught between the loss of sensory closeness and the acquisition of mobility and 
agency (Schwartz & Ryan 2003:161), constructing, within the passing blur of the 
landscape, a horizon upon which to rest the eye and into which text can be inserted 
to speak to the broader narrative of the travelled landscape.  
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b. The Seeing Eye 
 
With response to looking, mediation and mobility, Deleuze (1994:55) notes that 
representation only has a single centre, a unique and receding perspective. In 
consequence representation employs a false depth: representation mediates 
everything, but mobilises and moves nothing in the landscape itself. The photograph, 
the landscape painting and the lyric poem alike will, as systems of mediation, 
attempt to move us closer to place, object or situation. But essentially what remains 
is an unmovable and disembodied documentation of experience. On the subject of 
representation and photography, Barthes maintained a paradigm of the photograph 
as denotative or connotative sign. He noted that connotatively photographs bore an 
iconic relation to the object represented as “analogical perfection”; denotatively, 
photographs simultaneously existed as signs whose symbolic meaning required 
cultural capital to decode. Barthes (Jay 1993a:441) observes that  
science interprets the gaze in three (combinable) ways: in terms of 
information (the gaze informs), in terms of relation (gazes are 
exchanged), in terms of possession (by the gaze, I touch, I attain, I seize, 
I am seized): three functions: optical, linguistic, haptic. But the gaze 
seeks: something, someone. It is an anxious sign: singular dynamics for 
a sign: its power overflows it. 
 
This restlessness of the gaze is partly taken up in John Berger’s claim that “in every 
act of looking there is an expectation of meaning” (Berger 1982:117). Essentially, 
then, in contrast to the embodied viewer, the viewer of a photograph is not as aware 
of 
the being-there of the thing (which any copy could provoke) but an 
awareness of its having-been-there. What we have is a new space-time 
category: spatial immediacy and temporal anteriority, the photograph 
being an illogical conjunction between the here-now and the there-then 
(Jay 1993a:443 – 444).  
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In this way, “the camera relieves us of the burden of memory” and “records in order 
to forget” (Berger in Michaels 2000:23). 
 
The term “aesthetics” derives from aesthesis (sense-perception). As Heidegger 
(1962) notes, for the pre-Socratic Greeks aesthesis was associated with the process 
of revealing and concealing (alethia), with sensory perception trusted as knowledge. 
From early Greek philosophy onwards, questions concerning the acquisition of 
knowledge have frequently been reduced to the condition of having seen, and thus 
the existence of things in the world becomes similarly confined to that which can be 
seen (as in the case of the verifiable photograph). This was especially the case 
during the period of post-Enlightenment. However, the history of aesthetics has 
overshadowed this sense of the term: from antiquity on, a history of philosophy and 
Aesthetic Theory alike commenced with a grand metaphysical project to divide sense 
perception from reason and logos. This project culminates in the Age of Reason, with 
the final subordination of all aesthetics to the categories of representation. 
Consequently, Post-Kantian philosophy and Aesthetic Theory has attempted to invert 
this hierarchy, willing representation into a subset of aesthetics.  
In the Cartesian model, the intellect inspects entities modelled on retinal 
images . . . . In Descartes’ conception – the one that became the basis 
for modern epistemology – it is representations, which are in the “mind” 
(Jay 1993a:70). 
 
Indeed, this primacy of visual perception has provided most of the conditions for a 
Cartesian objectivity (see also chapter 4), which separates the mind from the body, 
and continues to uphold the status of visualising technologies in both the scientific 
realm and that of popular culture.  
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The effect of this ocularcentrism on the subject-object relation cannot be overstated: 
the difference between subjects and objects of knowledge is largely sustained by a 
perceptual hierarchy where tactility, haptic proximity, motility and sound have been 
rendered subordinate and secondary to the act of seeing and the criteria of visibility. 
Inherently, representation involves a perceptual functioning: as Tuan (1990:12) 
reminds us, the notion of perception as a “reaching out to the world” is recognised 
by its Latin root “percipere” to take hold of, feel or understand. Essentially, this 
“reaching out” is mainly experienced through our eyes and largely associated with 
our predominant sense of sight.  
 
One third of the highest level of our cerebral cortex is devoted to visual processing, 
with the world providing an abundant input of light signals to our eyes in a seemingly 
instantaneous action, with the eye serving a similar function to that of a camera 
(Long 1992:8). But while colour and shape provide sensations that our eyes 
translate, it can be argued that the same does not count for size or distance and that 
these have to be learned through experience. As a child I used to rest on the carpet 
looking up at the ceiling, and I would for hours without end allow myself to imagine 
that I could “walk” the ceiling as if it was a floor surface of some kind. I could 
deceive myself into “walking” the ceiling with my eye, shifting the “above” into an 
optic “below”. Perhaps similarly, one can call to mind the simple optic effect of an 
early Giotto painting, where the viewer is able to imagine touching the top of a 
mountain as if it is of the same optical distance as any fore-grounded figure. 
 
Traditionally, Brunelleschi is seen as the practical inventor of perspective, with 
Alberti almost universally acknowledged as the first theoretical interpreter of 
perspectival theory. In the development of a simple optic devise, Brunelleschi 
observed the fundamental techniques of perspectival observation: through a 
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peephole cut into a small panel, the viewer could gaze through the hole, observing 
the picture before his eye as flat and renderable.  
 
 
Figure 19: 
Brunelleschian perspective device: peephole and mirror 
 
In this manner, the three-dimensional rationalised space of perspectival vision could 
be rendered on a two-dimensional surface by following the transformational 
conventions as specified in Alberti’s De Pittura and later treatises by Viator and 
Dürer. The basic devise followed the concept of a symmetrical visual pyramids or 
cones with one of their apexes representing the receding, vanishing or centric point 
in the image or painting, the other representing the eye of the viewer or painter. In 
Alberti’s metaphor, the transparent window that was the canvas could also be 
understood as a flat mirror reflecting the geometricalised space of the scene depicted 
back onto the no less geometricalised space radiating out from the viewing eye. 
Notably, it was conceived as a singular, “lone eye”, looking through the peephole at 
the scene in front of it. Understood to be static, unblinking and fixed, the singular 
eye moved with what later scientists called “saccadic” jumps from one focal point to 
another (Jay 1993b:116).  
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Similarly, da Vinci explained the Albertian grid in simple terms: “Perspective is 
nothing else than seeing a place behind a plane of glass, quite transparent, on the 
surface of which the objects behind the glass are drawn” (Pinker 1998:216). Despite 
the simplicity of this statement, Berger describes a significant implication of this kind 
of action:  
Perspective makes the single eye the centre of the world. Everything 
converges on to the eye as to the vanishing point of infinity. The visible 
world is arranged for the spectator as the universe was once thought to 
be arranged for God (1972:16). 
 
In this sense, the static and fixed eye of perspectival vision clearly follows the logic 
of the Gaze rather than that of the Glance, producing a visual take that was 
eternalised and reduced to a disembodied, singular point of view (Bryson 1986). In 
what Bryson (1986:94) calls the “founding perception” of the Cartesian perspectival 
tradition, “the gaze of the painter arrests the flux of phenomena, contemplates the 
visual field from a vantage point outside the mobility of duration, in an eternal 
moment of disclosed presence”. He argues that “while in the moment of viewing, the 
viewing subject unites his gaze with the Founding Perception, in a moment of perfect 
recreation of that first epiphany” (Bryson 1986:94). 
 
The implementation of this visual order allowed for a number of consequences: the 
abstract indifference inherent to perspectival gazing resulted in the withdrawal of the 
painter or viewer’s emotional involvement with the objects viewed or depicted, 
consequently widening the gap between seer and seen. In addition, there occurred a 
loss of what St. Augustine had anxiously termed “ocular desire”, the body of the 
viewer and painter forgotten in the name of an allegedly disincarnated, totalizing eye 
(Jay 1993b:117). Even in the case of Dürer’s Draughtsman Drawing a Nude (see 
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figure 14) the draughtsman is observing the female nude through a screen of 
perspectival threads, “largely in the service of a rectifying male look that turned its 
target into stone” (ibid). 
 
It can be argued that the Albertian grid of perspective turned particular places into 
visual places to be manipulated; accordingly these sites become commodities rather 
than places of engagement. Quite suitably then, the Cartesian philosophy of cogito 
me cogitare finds a close relative in perspectival distancing; indeed Cartesian 
dualism valorises the disembodied eye, so much so that the spectatorial rather than 
incarnated eye implies a body consigned to objecthood and a denial of any link 
between subject and object (Jay 1993a:91). In this, vision consists of a basic and 
subtle power-play between the subject who looks and the object or target of the 
gaze, with the viewer denoting a dominant and typically masculine power; the object 
– the landscape or body - is viewed, serving as a compliant and feminine receptor 
(Jay 1993a:228, Rodaway 1994:123).  
More than any senses, the eye objectifies and masters. It sets at a 
distance, and maintains at a distance . . . . In our culture the 
predominance of the look over the smell, taste, touch and hearing has 
brought about an impoverishment of bodily relations. The moment the 
look dominates, the body looses its materiality (Irigaray in Jay 
1993a:493). 
 
Cartesian perspectivalism held a scientific view of the world as situated in a 
mathematically regular spatiotemporal order filled with natural objects that could 
only be observed from without and by the unemotional eye of the natural researcher. 
In a comparison to Alberti’s window, Berger describes this view as “ a safe let into a 
wall, a safe in which the visible has been deposited” (1972:109).  
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The technique of perspective relied on the artist and the subject remaining in the 
same fixed position with the Albertian velo or veil of threads projected from a single 
vanishing point. In order to keep a fixed perspective, the artist used one eye and did 
not move his head. Clearly, seeing with one eye through a piece of glass without 
moving one’s head speaks of a disembodied engagement with the world, where 
person, place and nature are synthetically divorced. What is seen is reduced to a 
view, a dot or outline, removed from worldly experience and relationship. The 
invention of perspective is typically seen as a movement away from the previously 
stylised, although expressionistic Byzantine depictions; in turn these depictions are 
to be seen as a development away from the naturalistic Roman frescoes. It can be 
argued that Renaissance perspective created space that was constructed rather than 
experienced, and that this soon became a code for visual reality and a radical tool for 
illusion fuelling a need for appearances of reality that still influences how we see and 
act in the world today. In this manner the advantaged, albeit static, centre of 
perspectival vision verified the objectivity of sight and separated the viewer from the 
world. As Jay (1993:54) points out “no longer did the painter seem as emotionally 
involved in the space he depicted; no longer was the beholder absorbed in the 
canvas”. Distance was established for both the artist and viewer, with an 
“ocularcentric discourse” and a history of vision as the “master sense of the modern 
era, variously described as the heyday of Cartesian perspectivalism, the age of the 
world picture, and the society of the spectacle or surveillance” (Jay 1993a: 543). 
Distance – and its dependency on measurement – also contributed to the diminishing 
of place. This was a period of the “mathematization of nature” (Dean & Millar 
2005:16), whereby the world was engaged only insofar as it could be mathematically 
determined. Galileo, Descartes and Locke removed what were viewed as the 
“secondary qualities” of place – such as colour, temperature and texture – from their 
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investigations, as none of these could be converted to assessable distances and so 
were extraneous to the matter at hand (Dean & Millar 2005). 
 
Building on perspectival theory, the tradition of landscape painting was soon to be 
followed by a commoditisation of the represented landscape and image in the form of 
oil paintings to be sold and possessed, with the natural world transformed into a 
“standing reserve” for the surveillance (Heidegger 1978:298). Fundamentally, the 
capacity of perspective to distance and to subsequently create uniform, infinite, 
isotropic space was agreeable to both modern science and capitalism in that the 
“placement of objects in a relational field, objects with no intrinsic value of their own 
outside those relations, may be said to have paralleled the fungibility of exchange 
value under capitalism” (Jay 1993a:57-59).  
 
It is important to note that the inscriptions in the South African landscape consist of 
both textual information (words, names, dates or phrases) and material information 
(they have been produced using stone from the specific locations and have been 
chalked white to be highlighted or made visible in an otherwise empty and 
continuous landscape of similarity). Building on gestalt psychology, 
phenomenologists have discussed at great length the figure-ground structure of both 
static and dynamic perception in which the figure is typically clear while the ground 
recedes eventually into an indeterminate background (Husserl 1982:70-71).  
Let us imagine a white patch on a homogeneous background. All the 
points in the patch have a certain “function” in common, that of forming 
themselves into a “shape”. The colour of the shape is more intense, and 
as it were more resistant than that of the background; the edges of the 
white patch ‘belong’ to it, and are not part of the background although 
they adjoin it: the patch appears to be placed on the background and 
does not break it up. Each part arouses the expectation of more than it 
contains, and this elementary perception is therefore already charged 
with a meaning. But, if the shape and the background, as a whole, are 
not sensed, they must be sensed, one may object, in each of their points. 
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To say this is to forget that each point in its turn can be perceived only as 
a figure on a background (Merleau-Ponty 1962:4). 
 
As Merleau-Ponty suggests, the basic tenet of Gestalt theory is that the simplest 
thing that can be given in perceptual experience is not a sensation or quality, but 
rather a figure on a background. But whereas the Gestalt theorists took this to be an 
empirical, psychological fact, Merleau-Ponty argues that  
this [figure on a background] is not a contingent characteristic of factual 
perception. . . . It is the very definition of the phenomenon of perception, 
that without which a phenomenon cannot be said to be a perception at all 
(1962:4).  
Phenomenologists consider perceptual experience to involve the implicit, background 
awareness of one's body. For something to be a likely object of perceptual 
experience it must be the kind of thing that can be experienced as being situated in 
relation to the spatial vantage point provided by one's body. Indeed, the spatial 
position of one's body determines in part the figure-ground structure of perception: 
the figure corresponds to the focus of one's gaze and the ground to what one sees in 
the surroundings. Furthermore, the perceptual surroundings can be differentiated 
into the immediate spatial context of the figure on the one hand and the 
indeterminate background of the periphery on the other, with the indeterminate 
background including the marginal presence of one's own body. Thus the background 
awareness of the body turns out to be essential to the figure-ground structure of 
perceptual experience: the perceptual object not only stands out against an external 
background, it is situated within an implicit bodily space. In Merleau-Ponty's words: 
"one's own body is the third term, always tacitly understood, in the figure-
background structure, and every figure stands out against the double horizon of 
external and bodily space" (1962:101).  
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When passing by a stone text in the landscape, one can argue that to a certain 
extent, a distance between the viewer and the viewed is set and maintained in that 
the text is experienced on the horizon of vision. In the seeing and subsequent 
reading of text, the viewer is mainly sourcing information and significance in the 
form of understanding from the textual format of the marking or inscription. There is 
no true need or context for it to be viewed or materially acknowledged as made of 
stone. There is an insolvency of direct bodily relation to the materiality of the site. 
Quite appropriately then these stone texts, as seen in surrender to the colonial 
histories and settings of their production and functioning, provide resonance with the 
Cartesian dichotomy of the disembodied and spectatorial eye.  
 
Furthermore, on the loss of materiality and the distancing capacity of sight, Tuan 
(1990:10) observes that  
The person who “sees” is an onlooker, a sightseer, someone not 
otherwise involved in the scene. The world perceived through the eyes is 
more abstract than that known to us through the other senses. . . . 
Distant objects can only be seen: hence we have the tendency to regard 
seen objects as “distant” - as not calling forth any strong emotional 
response – even though they may in point of fact be close to us. 
 
In the distancing of the stone texts, a maintainable horizon is given to an otherwise 
“empty” or alleged semiotically “mute” landscape (Coetzee 1988:9), with the focus 
on a passive reception of objectively confirmed information, by an uninvolved viewer. 
There exists a fundamental difference in viewing these inscribed landscapes from a 
distance and from within the landscape itself; from close-up the site reveals an 
essential materiality of production. On a most basic level, it is not possible to read 
the text from within the immediacy of the produced marks. Instead the eye is 
“caught” in the materially of stone and chalk (see figures 20, 21) in a close, even if 
motile form of seeing. In short, the text is too large and too close to the body to be 
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read by the eye. “Taken in at a footpace, it is a form of seeing that redraws the eye 
into the specificities of the physical environment as into the physical body of the 
seer” (Dubow in Bender & Winer 2001:249). It is only in leaving the landscape, in 
the activation of the disembodied eye that the texts reveal themselves in the 
landscape (see figure 22) and a way of reading the sign and not merely seeing it14 
occurs. 
 
 
Figure 20: 
An example of the immediacy and materiality of the chalked stone in the text BEAUFORT-WEST, 
seen from up-close and from within the landscape.  
 
                                           
14 For Rousseau, to know only of the formalised redescription of the landscape – the written word, the 
cartographic sign – would be to commit a fundamental epistemological error. He states: “Without the idea 
of represented things, the representative signs are nothing. One must not read, one must see” 
(1991:827). 
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Figure 21: 
Only in providing some distance between the eye and the stone text, can the letter “W” in 
BEAUFORT-WEST be discerned, here seen from the top of the koppie, looking back towards the 
freeway. 
 
 
Figure 22: 
In leaving the immediacy of the stone facture, the toponym BEAUFORT-WEST can clearly be 
viewed, here seen from the freeway that runs past the town of Beaufort-West, South Africa. 
 
Although we cannot escape the fact that these stone texts are aimed at a singular 
distanced viewer, we have to consider a critical reading of single perspective, with 
 94 
the reading of these texts as significantly complex. Let me at this point acknowledge 
that perception is culturally determined by language, socio-economic factors and 
personal histories (Tuan 1990), and that the eye is essentially not passive in itself. 
Let us also recognise the deep suspicion that sets a backdrop to vision and its 
dominant role: 
If postmodernism teaches us anything, it is to be suspicious of single 
perspectives, which like grand narratives, provide totalizing accounts of a 
world too complex to be reduced to a unified point of view (Jay 
1993a:545). 
 
We can no longer assume the universality of visual experience: the elemental 
qualities of phenomenology are understood to be a description of lived experience, 
with emphasis on the immediacy of this experience (Dufrenne 1973:549). 
Immediacy is phenomenologically seen as the fundamental characteristic of all actual 
experience, of experiencing; it is spatial and temporal, here and now (Schultz 
1970:318). 
 
 95 
c. The Touching Eye 
 
Csordas (1994) repeats Merleau-Ponty’s call for a theory of being-in-the world to 
evoke a sense of existential immediacy, in this he supports the phenomenological 
notion of the lived experience and the ensuing focus on embodied subjectivity. For 
Csordas (1994:10) this immediacy is a “temporally/historically informed sensory 
presence and engagement” and seeks to place the body as a central analytic theme, 
as the “existential ground of culture and self” (Hassard, Holliday & Willmott 
2000:65).  
 
In the context of the stone inscription of landscape, the notion of the immediacy of 
experience (as found within the landscape) has to take account of multiple positions 
because, not only are these texts readable from a distance by the passer-by moving 
across the landscape, there also exists the possibility for these texts to be viewed 
from within the materiality of the stone landscape. To add to this, I propose that 
there arises a third option of experiencing a sense of immediacy of the stone text 
through the initiation of a special kind of sensory perception or what is otherwise 
referred to as the haptic. 
 
In the shift from the optic to the haptic, we find an alternative approach to the 
understanding of space as 
something that has been made room for. . . . A boundary is not that 
which something stops, but, as the Greeks recognised, the boundary is 
that from which something begins its presencing. That is why the concept 
is that of horismos, that is, the horizon, the boundary. Space is in 
essence that for which room has been made, that which is let into its 
bounds. That for which room is made is . . . joined, that is, gathered, by 
virtue of a location, that is by such a thing as the bridge. (Heidegger 
1971:146).  
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Heidegger’s understanding of the haptic sense, including the tactile, kinaesthetic and 
proprioceptive senses, describes aspects of engagement that are qualitatively 
dissimilar to the experience of the visual sense. Where the visual sense authorises a 
moving, distant and debatably disconnected viewpoint, the haptic sense functions by 
contact, contiguity and resonance. The haptic sense leaves the exterior or surface of 
the body “porous”, being perceived at once inside (on the skin’s surface) and in 
external space, enabling the perception of colour, weight, pressure, balance, texture, 
temperature, vibration and presence15. Early research on haptic perception explains 
it as sensory stimulation involving contact adjoining the body, or made perceptible 
by the use of the body. In this manner, the haptic sense was considered a “proximal” 
sense, one relating to the sensing of objects in contact with the body, with the hand 
considered to be the chief means of perceiving the character of surfaces and 
resistance. As a “proximal” sense, the haptic is typically distinguished from vision 
and audition as “distal” senses which perceive objects more distant from the margins 
of the skin’s surfaces (Loomis & Lederman in Boff, et al 1986). 
 
But what is significant about the haptic sense is that despite its categorisaton as a 
proximal sense it is indeed concerned with distal perception as well (Kennedy 1993). 
Accordingly, haptic perception can embody the energies involved in sensing space: 
its presences, temperature, pressure and resonances. It is the affective touch, a 
plane of feeling distinct from actual physical contact. And inside the skin it is 
interoception, an aspect of the haptic sense, which perceives the visceral workings 
and felt intensities of our interior bodies. It is, in other words, the look that touches 
an object. 
                                           
15 Previously noted by Locke and Descartes to be “secondary qualities” of place. 
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In developing the notion of the haptic, Deleuze and Guattari provides us with the 
impression of “smooth space”16, a space that must be moved through by constant 
reference to the immediate environment, as when navigating an expanse of snow or 
sand, water or rock. Close-range space is navigated not through reference to the 
abstractions of maps or compasses but by haptic perception, which attends to their 
particularity. Deleuze and Guattari’s privileged agents of haptic perception are 
nomadic people, such as Inuit and Bedouins.  
It seems to us that the Smooth is both the object of a close vision par 
excellence and the element of a haptic space (which may be as much 
visual or auditory as tactile). The Striated, on the contrary, relates to a 
more distant vision, and a more optical space – although the eye in turn 
is not the only organ to have this capacity (Deleuze & Guattari 
1987:493).  
There is a clear political distinction evident in Deleuze and Guattari’s differentiation 
between the Smooth and the Striated, implying two ways of occupying space: 
smooth space is lived in intimately with an immediacy of experience, without a 
strong distinction between yourself and your surroundings17. Striated space is divided 
in order to conquer: in taking a distance on space, it is possible to mark it out, to 
map it, and to construct it into territory. In this manner, optical visuality perceives 
objects as distinct, distant, and identifiable, existing in illusionary three-dimensional 
space with a strong dependence on the maintenance of a clear, crisp relationship 
between figure and ground. Optical visuality is essential for distance perception: for 
surveying a landscape and for assembling close distinctions between things at a 
distance. The subject of vision - the beholder - is also regarded to be separate, as 
                                           
16 Let us not be confused by the use of the term ‘smooth’ and the textural implication of this term: I do 
not describe the rocky qualities of the Karoo landscape as ‘smooth’. The term here is in application to the 
immediacy of the lived moment, its close proximity to the body and ourselves and not texture itself. 
17 This can be seen in the example of a landscape of snow or sand, but could easily be translated into a 
private space such as your room or bed. 
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having solid borders that demarcate the beholder from the thing beheld18. It 
conceives of the other, the object of vision, as distant and unconnected to the 
subject of vision. Optical visuality is necessary, but only serves to represent one side 
of vision: haptic visuality perceives the world as though it were touching it, close, 
inscrutable, seeming to exist on the surface of the image. Haptic images perturb the 
figure-ground relationship.  
 
Deleuze and Guattari (1987:492) considers the notion of close–range vision in 
contrast to long-distance vision, to be directly linked to “tactile” or rather “haptic” 
space, as distinguished from optical space. According to them the term “haptic” is a 
better phrase than “tactile” since it does not establish an opposition between the two 
sense organs (sight and touch), but rather invites the assumption that the eye itself 
may fulfil this non-optical function (Deleuze & Guattari 1987:492). 
 
It was Alöis Riegl that gave fundamental aesthetic status to the pairing of close-
vision-haptic space (ibid). He borrowed the term from psychology, haptein, for a kind 
of vision that “grabs” the thing it looks at19. Riegl’s teleological history of art narrates 
the ruin of a physical tactility in art and the rise of illusionary, figurative space. By 
contrast, haptic space relates to the image as object rather than illusionistic space 
for identification; it appeals to a perception that is embodied and material. Haptic 
space encourages a kind of recognition in which there is a joint dissolving of subject 
                                           
18 This distinction serves a valid and important function; consider the value of optic visuality in firing a 
weapon for example. 
19 Riegl was a historian of textiles and Persian carpets. These carpets with their endless, interleaved 
patterns do not allow the eye to rest in one place; they invite the eye to move along them, caressing their 
surface. Contemplating these patterns does something to dissolve the boundaries between the beholder 
and the thing beheld. 
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and object, viewer and viewed, where looking is not about power but about yielding. 
Haptic images invite our eyes to linger on the surface of the image rather than pull 
us into idealised space, assisting us in feeling the connectivity between ourselves, 
the image, its material support, and the world to which the image20 (or view) 
connects us. It is vital to take note that there is never an absolute separation 
between haptic and optical; rather they slide into one another. As an example, 
consider how our vision moves from optical to haptic when we admire our lover: 
haptic visuality has a strong sense of the material connection between vision and the 
object. It is thus mimetic: it presses up to the object and takes its shape. As the 
complement of symbolic knowledge, in which representation is based on abstraction, 
mimesis is a form of representation based on contact, getting close enough to the 
other thing to become it. I am not concerned in posing a binary between touch and 
vision, but rather with how the stone texts pose an intermingling of these sense 
modalities. While the visual gives trajectories – sightlines – between the viewer and 
the surfaces of the landscape inscription, the haptic defines the affective charge – 
the felt dimensionality – of a spatial context.  
 
To explain the relation between sight, felt dimensionality, and the immediacy of 
experience21, let us consider the following: on the matter of painting and the notion 
of smooth, haptic space, Deleuze and Guattari remark that the law of painting 
requires that it be done “from close range, even if it is seen from a distance” 
(1987:493). Consider the stone texts in the landscape (their production in close 
range but subsequent reading by means of distance) in light of the following: 
                                           
20 Note that an image itself can be haptic or optical, while haptic visuality is a term of reception. The 
viewer can choose, to some degree, whether to see optically or haptically: try taking off your glasses, or 
focusing on the windshield when you are driving, rather than the street beyond. 
21 As a drawing lecturer, I have found that the technique of touching one’s face or body in order to draw it, 
serves to accurately describe the relation between sight, felt dimensionality and the immediacy of 
drawing. In this manner, touch serves to explain or identify what is seen through the body. 
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Cézanne spoke of the need to no longer see the wheat field, to be too 
close to it, to lose oneself without landmarks in smooth space. Afterward 
striation can emerge: drawing, strata, the earth, “stubborn geometry”, 
“the measure of the world”, “geological foundations”. . . . (Deleuze & 
Guattari 1987:493). 
The idea of being “absorbed” in the image is of course not unique to painting; Bloch 
considers the experience of immediacy, when one is so close to the subject that it 
essentially excludes the possibility of vision (Iampolski 2003:306). For Bloch, 
immediacy lies within the darkness of the lived moment, “darkness” as a designation 
for immediate proximity. In his analysis, landscape as a Cartesian subject (and 
necessarily optically divided from the viewer) can “appear” only when mediation 
penetrates actual immediacy, when distance is activated in order to view, map or 
read the text in the landscape, be it through the act of leaving the landscape or 
viewing it from afar. It is noteworthy to consider the notion of “darkness”: that in the 
lived moment there no longer exists a division between the body and the world, the 
haptic and optic slide into one another and one loses oneself without landmarks in 
smooth space. Deleuze and Guattari refer to these as “monadological” (1987:494) 
views that can be interlinked only on a nomadic or itinerant space; the whole and the 
parts give the eye that beholds them a function that is haptic rather than optical. In 
this sense the haptic is activated by itinerant nomadic actions or by movement 
across the landscape, whether by car, train or other devises of passing by. 
 
Resounding the relation between train views and photography, Bruno (2007) uses 
cinema as a metaphor for the haptic routes of spatiality22. As a kind of panoramic 
wallpaper, cinema has its spatial ancestry in the new “fashions” of spatiality and the 
pursuit of cultural travelling that marked the rise of modernity: from the 
topographical views of painting and cartography to landscape design and panoramic 
                                           
22 Film language speaks literary of travel: consider the French word for camera movement: travelling, also 
the use of the term “pan” standing in English for ‘panorama’ and panoramique in French. 
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vision. At the heart of this is a transformation of vision taking effect not within the 
framework of an incorporeal eye but rather within the territory of a new travelling 
vision craving spatial expansion. While the spectator was immersing space in 
movement, a new architectonics and “picturesque revolution” were put to action: one 
born of locating sites in moving perspectives, escalating outward to incorporate ever 
larger servings of space. The new sensibility occupied the physicality of observers, 
challenging their ability to take in space and more space – a mobilised space (Bruno 
2007:170). As the production of travel discourse (from literary to ocular and spatial 
constructions) started to increase during the eighteenth century, a haptic 
consciousness was being produced. This was embedded in the combination of a 
sensualist theory of imagination with the touch of physicality, with the spectator 
altogether ingrained in the joys of scanning sites and scapes, in moving through and 
with landscapes, as Corbin (1995:138) states: 
Taking in the panorama with a sweeping glance, evaluating its variety . . . 
letting the eye slide from distant horizon down to the foreground in a sort 
of travelling shot, and learning to expand the depth of field of one’s 
vision. . . . 
 
In this way, cinematic motion is said to have succeeded genealogically from the 
travelling history of spatial phenomenology: it is possible to trace a secure route 
ranging from topographical views and maps, to the architectonics of gardens, the 
exposure of the impulse of travel to more people, and the development of a leisure 
industry. Following the course of modernity, we find an array of advances:  
from view painting to garden views, from travel sketches to itinerant 
viewing boxes, from panoramas to other geographical “-oramas” to forms 
of interior/exterior mapping, from the mobile views of train travel to 
urban streetwalking, the subject was “incorporated” into motion pictures. 
It is this moving, haptic space that created the (e)motion picture and its 
spectator – a body who is indeed a “passenger” (Bruno 2007:172).  
 
The body and geography unmistakably share a material field in the terrain of lived 
space; the domain of physicality is deliberated at the crossroads of “inside” and 
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“outside”. “The Enlightenment planner emphasised the journey. . . . Thus were the 
words ‘artery’ and ‘veins’ applied to city streets by designers who sought to model 
traffic systems on the blood system of the body” (Sennett 1994:261), defining a new 
mobile and haptic mapping between body and city. The fervour for travelling and the 
opening out of spatiality persisted in the nineteenth century’s mechanised version of 
the travelling eye, so much so that travelling, visiting museums, studying maps or 
observing a city’s plan were all optical processes by which the observer organised his 
visual memory and thoughts. In this manner a new field of observation that united 
distinct spatio-temporal configurations emerged, developing them into a new map, 
with a new observer with a spectatorial body. 
 
To return to the metaphor of the cinema, it is important to note that filmic space is 
not quite the homogenous space of unified central perspective, depicted as if 
positioned in front of the body and seen with a single and immobile eye (Panofsky in 
1997:29). The filmic eye is not external and prior to representation, instead it 
represents a shift away from the Albertian perspectival model as a heterogeneous 
space comprised of metramorphic centres, “the moving image ‘embraces’ the shifting 
trajectories of psychophysiological space, where the spectator-passenger is mapped 
within landscape” (Bruno 2007:178). It is crucial to recognise that historically not all 
perspectival drawing was uniformly composed to assert the unity of a body in space; 
various artists strove to acknowledge the framework of a shifting vision or the 
embodiment of the beholder, with Dutch art from the sixteenth century providing 
vital examples.  
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Figure 23: 
Albertian construction of perspective. 
 
 
Figure 24: 
Viator’s construction: In comparison Alberti and Viator’s constructions appear confusingly 
similar, but the difference is clearly exposed in Vignola’s diagrammatic comparison between 
the two: whereas Alberti’s viewer is disembodied, Viator’s eye is within the picture itself.  
 
The case of protofilmic spatiality found in the perspective drawings of Jan Vredeman 
de Vries exemplifies this approach: perceived to be the most important Dutch master 
of perspective, de Vries’s work made a strong impression on illusional architectural 
imaging. As an architectural designer, graphic artist and painter, he produced an 
important body of engravings on architecture, ornamental design and gardens. It is 
his drawings that produced the spatial effect that has been called an “adding on of 
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views of the moving eye” (Alpers 1983:58). In his work, de Vries reiterated the 
views of the French priest Jean Pélerin, known as Viator. Viator assumed that 
representation replicates vision, which he defined in terms of a moving eye reflecting 
the light it receives like a burning mirror or miroir ardente23 (Alpers 1983:53). By 
significant contrast, Alberti stated that the operation of the eye itself is of no 
significance to a consideration of pictorial construction, with Viator in response 
placing the eye point not at a distance in front of the picture but instead on the very 
picture surface itself where it establishes the horizontal line that marks the eye level 
of persons in the picture. The eye of the viewer (characteristically prior and external 
to the picture plane in the Albertian construction [see figure 23]), and the single, 
central vanishing point to which it is coupled in distance and position, have their 
counterparts here within the picture (see figure 24).  
 
 
Figure 25: 
Jan Vredeman de Vries 
An illustration of the circular arc of the turning eye. 
 
                                           
23 The miroir ardente refers to a curved mirror that can bring about fire by directing and concentrating its 
rays of light. 
 105 
 
Figure 26: 
Jan Vredeman de Vries 
A graphic of a section of the circular arc transcribed by the turning eye, laid out flat as 
the horizon lie crossing the pictorial surface. 
 
 
Figure 27: 
Jan Vredeman De Vries 
The multiplication of distance points leading the eye to a variety of views up and 
down, in and out of an empty room. 
 
De Vries affirms these views with an illustration of the basic terms of Viator’s visual 
geometry (see figure 25 and 26), showing the circular arc as set down by the turning 
eye. This section, when laid out flat, is the horizon line crossing the pictorial surface. 
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A later illustration (see figure 27) by de Vries reveals the multiplication of distance 
points that are leading the eye to an assortment of views up and down, in and out of 
a vacant room; it is here that we find the effect of an “adding-on of views of the 
moving eye” as recommended by Viator. The result is that when figures enter the 
space, they are “captives of the world seen, entangled Gulliver-like in the lines of 
sight that situate them” (Alpers 1983:58), so much so that the various eyes and a 
multitude of things viewed that make up such surfaces produce a syncopated effect, 
and we can under no circumstances stand back and take in a homogenous space 
(Alpers 1983).  
 
Mapping the spectator in this cumulative motion, de Vries’s perspective anticipates 
filmic scenography. There is a clear inclusion of the inhabitant or intruder in these 
spaces, and in creating such space de Vries presents diversely embodied 
perspectives. The perspectival techniques themselves employ the dynamics of 
multiplicity: a compound system of exposed perspectival lines, generated from more 
than one viewpoint, captures the emotion of the body space. The moving spectator – 
in its own right a body that is shifting in space – is charted inside these architectural 
views (Bruno 2007:179). Beyond perspectivism, we are able to correlate these views 
(with de Vries in mind) to the mapping of space: the techniques of surveying 
architectural and landscape views expressed a relationship between space, 
movement and narrative, thus establishing a tradition of spatial storytelling (Bruno 
2007:80).  
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Figure 28: 
John Rocque 
View painting: Garden plan of Chiswick House, Middlesex 
1736 
 
 
Figure 29: 
Claes Jansz 
Leo Hollandicus 
1622 
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To a large extent we are indebted to the pre-photographic tradition of the 
topographical view in painting, such as the Dutch city view or the Italian 
Vedutismo24, which resulted in a form of depiction that moved narratively. “View 
painting” sought to chart space in time, and by representing the life of the sites 
encapsulated its motion (see figure 28 and 29), so that spatial depiction became a 
pre-photographic historical documentation. 
 
As we have seen earlier in this chapter, with the development of photographic 
technology a space could be mapped at the moment that it was captured; later with 
motion pictures it became possible to map the spatio-temporal flow, thus re-
embodying a sense of place. Mapping and its art of describing implies a haptic 
rendering mainly indebted to the multiple perspectives of views that illustrated lived 
space and made landscape inhabited or marked. In depicting place geographically, 
the explorative force at length mapped this terrain and formed sites into “–scapes”. 
These topographical scenes of places often expressed the viewpoint of 
representational documentation with the techniques of observation being mobilised, 
as Hollander (1991) refers to these painterly scene designs as “moving pictures”. 
Often these views would employ techniques such as drawing remote objects closer 
and pushing back nearer ones. In an almost filmic analysis of space, these devises 
would separate it into parts to be read as a whole, in this way picturing place as an 
collection of incomplete views, a montage of spatial fragments panoramically linked 
by a mobile observer (Bruno 2007:181). 
 
In our consideration of the value of mapping as an art of describing and the relation 
between mapping, inscription and representation, we are provided with a clear 
                                           
24 Vedutismo was a particular manifestation of the observational gaze: as a form of urban imaging, these 
city views merged the codes of topography and landscape painting, creating imaginative and staged 
representational maps, with close–ups of spaces or important geographical narratives.  
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pointer from Vermeer. In his painting “The Art of Painting” (see figure 30), our 
attention is drawn to an impressive representation of a map. We are looking at a 
painter’s studio, the artist has started to render the leaves of a wreath on the head 
of a young woman that he is painting. A great map, hung so as to fill the back wall 
before which Vermeer has situated the painter and his model, creates the backdrop 
to this scene, but also serves to point out an interesting conversation around the 
close association between mapping and painting - and representation in general. The 
question is if this map is presented like a painting, to what impulse in painting does it 
correspond?  
 
 
 
Figure 30: 
Jan Vermeer  
The Art of Painting  
1665 67 
Oil on canvas 
120 by 100 cm 
Kunsthistorisches Museum, Vienna 
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Vermeer answers this himself: in the upper border of the painted map, one can 
clearly discern the word Descriptio in finely painted letters. As one of the most 
common terms used to designate the mapping enterprise, “description” was often 
applied to refer to mapmakers and publishers as the “describers of the world” (Alpers 
1983:122), but rarely applied to painters. Alpers (1983) argues that the aspiration of 
the Dutch painters of the time was to capture a great range of knowledge and 
information about the world on a surface. This included the use of words and, like 
mappers, they would often produce additive works that could not be taken in a single 
viewing point. Unlike the Italian model of art viewed through a “window”, Dutch art 
functioned rather like a map or surface on which was laid bare an assemblage of the 
world (Alpers 1983:122). In “The Art of Painting” the viewer is allowed an essential 
glimpse of this approach: framing the larger map of the Netherlands is a sequence of 
small landscape paintings, revealing a common scheme invented for topographical 
city views in the sixteenth century. In this map-to-painting arrangement the city is 
painted back into the mapping context from which it had emerged (Alpers 
1983:124).  
 
It is not difficult to tell landscapes and maps apart by their look: maps give us the 
measure of place and the connection between places, while landscape images are 
suggestive and communicate a viewer’s sense of it; until quite recently this 
difference was upheld professionally. Of course the borders between these disciplines 
have become quite blurred in the fields of geography, art and cartography; still, 
cartographers and art historians have been in essential agreement to maintain 
boundaries between maps and art, knowledge and decoration. “Topography” is again 
the term to use here, in this context normally employed to classify those landscape 
pictures or views that sacrifice art (as it is understood or defined) in the name of the 
recording of place (Alpers 1983:126). These boundaries would have perplexed the 
 111 
Dutch, who instead of being embedded in an investigation of the line drawn between 
maps and art, focused on the overlap and the basis of their resemblance. The 
sixteenth century set the pace for a general demand for news and trade, with the 
map serving to provide the root to this knowledge. Mapping was quite a common 
pastime and carried the potential act of description, both in public and private form, 
in the very act of drafting a map. Many artists were engaged in some aspect of 
mapping, ranging from Pieter Pourbus to Pieter Saenredam, Gaspar Wittel, Pieter 
Bruegel, and of course key artists of the time: Jacob van Ruisdael, Hendrik Goltzius 
and Philips Koninck.  
 
The word “picture”, as much as it was used in conversation around the pictorial 
presence of the map as something that made the world visually immediate (perhaps 
like a lens), was often accompanied or replaced by the term description, descriptio in 
Latin, description in French and beschryving in Dutch. All of these depend on the 
Latin scripto as an equivalent to the Greek graphõ. At the time, it was uncommon to 
refer to a picture as descriptive, a term more commonly applied to texts; when the 
Renaissance geographers used the term description it wanted to call to attention not 
the power of words but the sense in which images are drawn or inscribed like 
something written. Therefore it referred not to the persuasive power of words but to 
a mode of representation, with graphõ implying both picture and writing (Alpers 
1983:136). In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the term “description” was 
used to title both books relating to new surveying techniques and the more general 
kind of atlases or maps (such as the one in Vermeer’s painting).  
 
Similarly the word landschap was used to refer to both what the “surveyor was to 
measure and the artist to render” (ibid). In making use of the term “description”, the 
geographical texts accepted the graphic basis of their field while at the same time 
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relating their records to a concept of image making. In strong contrast to the 
Albertian views of the picture as a window with a distanced and disembodied human 
observer, both northern mapmakers and artists conceived of a picture as “a surface 
on which to set forth or inscribe”, [or describe], “the world rather than as a stage for 
significant human actions” (Alpers 1983:137). The question is: how can a map bring 
something to the eyes in the way a picture can? 
 
Consider the peculiarity of this claim, and reflect on the poignant example of a map 
(or is it a picture?) by the Dutch painter Jan Micker (see figure 31). Theorists believe 
that he based himself on the famous sixteenth century painting of Cornelius 
Anthonisz, and perhaps even closer to the truth: a work by Pieter van Ruisdael 
entitled “Panorama of Amsterdam, Its Harbour and the IJ”. In the work, Micker 
literally painted the mapped Amsterdam (Alpers 1983:157). 
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Figure 31:  
Jan Christaenz Micker 
View of Amsterdam 
 
 
Figure 32: Google Earth view of inscribed and contoured hill, Jinging, China 
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In this peculiar work he attempts to combine the graphic nature of the map with the 
mirroring qualities of a painting, and a few clues help us in our search for these 
relations: the list labelling landmarks at the lower right casts a shadow onto the sea 
and, even more arresting, the city is delicately coloured and browsed by scattered 
light and shade cast by unseen clouds25. In this Micker discloses an interesting 
ambition that can be used to conclude the discussion on inscription and the physical 
landscape as surface. This can be unloaded by means of the introduction of another 
image, that of a Google Earth view taken of an area in Jinging, China (see figure 32). 
In this image the viewer is faced with an interesting view. Indeed, at first glimpse it 
seems that one is observing a map of some sort, made evident through the 
identification of contour markings clearly following the shape of a mountainous body, 
and the unmistakable application and inscription of the numbers 1, 2, 3 and 4. Of 
course this is not a map; instead one is observing a photograph of a desolate and 
mountainous landscape, with the mapping effect physically inscribed onto the 
landscape as a surface. One might argue that both of these views represent a 
manner of physically mapping the surface of the land and a literalisation of the 
mappa mundi or “cloth of the world” effect. 
 
As with the stone texts in the South African landscape, these images reveal the 
merge between landscape and map and, instead of a linear, hierarchical and 
segregated association between reading and writing, seeing and reading, one finds 
an engagement with the body and the temporal dimensions to inscription in the 
physical mapping of the surface of the land. “Topographic” space as “a space in 
which writing is severed from its role as mere verbal description and instead is 
experienced as both a verbal and visual phenomenon” (Bolter 1991:62), becomes 
embodied space, with the view of the passer-by allowing for a slide of the optic into 
                                           
25 The presence of shadow here implies a clear acknowledgement of corporeal experience. 
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the haptic. Landscape becomes text, and the inscription on the surface of the 
landscape serves as a footnote in the itinerant reading of this text in the course of 
passage. 
 
Envision a map so huge and intricately drawn, so exquisitely rendered, that it forms 
an exact replica of the territory it represents, its details blending flawlessly with the 
ground depicted, its topographical precision erasing any signs of dissimilarity 
between the land and the cartographic analogue. In his fictional fragment Of 
Exactitude in Science Borges describes such a map:  
In that Empire, the Art of Cartography attained such Perfection that the 
map of a single Province occupied the entirety of a City, and a map of the 
Empire, the entirety of a Province. In time, those Unconscionable Maps no 
longer satisfied, and the Cartographers Guilds struck a Map of the Empire 
whose size was that of the Empire, and which coincided point for point 
with it. The following Generations, who were not so fond of the Study of 
Cartography as their Forbears had been, saw that that vast Map was 
Useless, and not without some Pitilessness was it, that they delivered it 
up to the Inclemencies of Sun and Winters. In the Deserts of the West, 
still today, there are Tattered Ruins of that Map, inhabited by Animals and 
Beggars: in all the Land there is no other Relic of the Disciplines of 
Geography.  From Travels of Praiseworthy Men (1658) by J. A. Suarez Miranda 
(Borges 1998:325) 
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5. Stones, Earth and Chalk: As Far As The Eye Can Touch 
I turned to writing. For a week, toiling from dawn to sunset, I trundled the wheelbarrows full 
of stones across the veld until I had a pile of two hundred smooth, round, the size of small 
pumpkins, in the space behind the house. 
 
(Coetzee 1977:132) 
I am not the spectator, I am involved, and it is my involvement in a point of view which 
makes possible both the finiteness of my perception and its opening out upon the complete 
world as a horizon of every perception. 
(Merleau-Ponty 1962:303) 
Against a cliff overlooking the road, a hedge had been planted to read WELCOME TO 
UMTALI. During the war, the terrorists chopped out the ‘L’ in WELCOME, so that the 
subsequent greeting read a chilling WE COME TO UMTALI. As quickly as the women from the 
Umtali Gardening Club directed the ‘garden boys’ to replant the all-important missing ‘L’, it 
was ripped out again, until the war was won (or lost, depending on whose side you were on) 
and the hedge was replanted to read, WELCOME TO MUTARE. 
(Fuller 2002:48) 
 
As Far As The Eye Can Touch is the title of an artistic project and exhibition created 
as practical component to my MA (FA), documenting a series of text based and 
mostly large-scale poetic interventions in the landscape. Over the last two years I 
have produced a chain of works by physically writing onto surfaces such as koppies, 
roads and frozen lakes using stones, earth, chalk or paint, and by physically 
modifying existing landscape inscriptions. As Far As The Eye Can Touch comprises of 
a collection of photographs and a series of site-objects produced in response to the 
notions of the passer-by and the surveying and marking of our ocularised 
landscapes. The exhibition was hosted by The Premises Gallery in Johannesburg in 
November 2007. 
 
In my artistic practice, the writing of text onto land is a performance: the body takes 
the place of the hand in writing. During the European winter of 2005 and 2006, I had 
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the opportunity to participate in the MAPS26 programme, an exchange between the 
Wits School of the Arts and the Ecole Cantonale d’art du Valais in Sierre, Switzerland. 
Sierre is located in the heart of the Cantonale Valais and serves as a kind of 
bookmark, a spacer dividing the mountain: towards the north, vineyards and sun; to 
the south, the icy blue entrance to Val d’Anniviers. Initially, in reply to the South 
African phenomena of chalked inscriptions on koppies, I envisioned a similar 
inscriptive placement of stone onto the inviting verticality of these mountains, but 
due to heavy snow, difficult working conditions and the uncompromising scale of 
these mountains, I soon realised I would have to revise my approach. Instead I 
chose to work with frozen bodies of water as tabula or surface for inscription, leading 
to the production of a site specific work entitled I Am The World On Which I Walk 
(see figure 33). As a landscape intervention, the work involved the exhaustive act of 
single-handedly moving frozen stones in a wheelbarrow over a substantial distance, 
from the River Rhône to a lake in the heart of Bois de Finges in Sierre, Switzerland 
and the subsequent writing with stone onto the precariously frozen surface of the 
water. Situated between the limestone massifs of the Bernese Alps and the granite 
reliefs of the Valais Alps, Bois de Finges is the biggest pine grove in Switzerland and 
one of the oldest forests in Europe.  
                                           
26 MAPS is a Master of the Arts in the Public Sphere and entails an exchange programme between Wits 
School of the Arts and the Ecole Cantonale d’art du Valais in Sierre, Switzerland. 
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Figure 33: 
Maja Marx 
I Am The World On Which I Walk 1 
2006 
Stones placed on frozen lake 
Bois de Finges, Sierre, Switzerland 
 
It took days to move the stones to the site of the frozen lake, the iced footpaths in 
the empty forest acting as slippery arteries first up and then down into the hollow in 
which the lake rests. The process of inscribing the surface of the lake was not a 
simple one: firstly, the stones had to be lowered down onto the banks of the lake; 
they then had to be moved onto the surface of the frozen water. As part of the 
preliminary procedure of acquiring permission to use the site, I had make sure that 
the ice was frozen to a point that could withstand my weight and that of the stones. 
After an unanticipated increase in temperature and the ice subsequently turning 
unstable, I was forced to produce a series of arm extensions lengthening into spade 
and broom points. I then continued to manoeuvre the stones onto the ice and into a 
simple grid ready for inscription. Fortunately the temperature dropped after a few 
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days and I could commence to position myself on the ice itself. Thus started the slow 
task of moving the stones across the ice into the letters that would eventually form 
the sentence: I AM THE WORLD ON WHICH I WALK. In the immediacy of this action, 
I experienced an extreme tension: on the one hand I had to move particularly slowly 
so as not to disturb the ice, all the time listening closely to any changes in sound as 
this could serve as an indicator of surface instability. On the other hand the frozen 
stones would congeal onto the surface of the ice, making it impossible to move 
without great exertion. One can argue that it involved a doubly embodied state of 
production: at the same time involving a raw materiality via the experience of weight 
of stone and one’s own body, the intensity of needing to know where to put each 
stone, and the underlying knowledge that one is perched atop a temporary and 
transient substance such as ice. It is precisely this tension between the anchoring 
potentiality of stone and the temporality of the surface beneath it that attracted me 
to the concept of writing with stone on ice. Writing with stones on ice embodied a 
poetic literalisation of the sentence I chose to use, I literally became the world on 
which I walked, writing myself onto the temporary tabula of the ice, the stones at 
the same time marking my time and actions atop a transient folio, and serving as an 
optic bridge across the water beneath (see figure 34). 
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Figure 34:  
Maja Marx 
I Am The World On Which I Walk: Bridge 
2006 
Stones placed on frozen lake 
Bois de Finges, Sierre, Switzerland 
 
I Am The World On Which I Walk directly employed the concept of palimpsest and 
erasure as device: in writing with stones on ice, I created a Freudian “mystic writing 
pad” or “perceptual apparatus”. In his 1925 essay, Freud offers the “mystic writing 
pad” as a concise and effective metaphor through which to think of the ephemeral 
operations of palimpsest and memory. In using the corresponding example of the 
classic children's toy in which marks are inscribed on a wax background and then 
“mystically” erased by lifting the plastic cover sheet, Freud proposes that memory 
should be considered as a form of imaginary palimpsest where mnemonic 
impressions emerge, merge, and re(e)merge through variable processes of 
transmutable layering. The “appearance and disappearance” of the lucid etchings on 
the magic writing pad are similar, he suggests, to “the flickering-up and passing-
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away of consciousness” in memory (Freud 1984:433). Apart from Derrida's reading 
of it as a successful model of the primacy of writing (1978), it also involves the 
invocation of the visual as a key element of mnemonic production, and the 
characterisation of memory as made up through a process of continuous movement, 
change and “trace”. The impact of I Am The World On Which I Walk relies on an 
understanding of this apparatus, and is accentuated by one’s tempero-spatial ability 
to envision the text eventually being swallowed by the water as the ice melts. 
 
In addition to the operation of moving and writing with stone on ice, it is crucial to 
realise a further aspect to the production of this work. The singularity and immediacy 
of the act of writing with stone necessitated leaving the site of operation in order to 
read what was being written. This took on the form of constantly moving between 
the immediacy of the site of inscription and a position beyond the text as “picture”, 
to that of the eye of a disembodied and distanced viewer. In this, I quoted Dürer’s 
1552 Draughtsman Drawing a Nude (see figure 14) in producing - as an optic devise 
- a basic viewfinder or optic grid for the anamorphic perspective of the text (see 
figure 35). The result is a “hovering text”, seen as if floating in the landscape when 
observed from the position of the viewfinder or aim. From within the immediacy of 
the stones on the ice, it was impossible to discern the text; instead only an 
anamorphic stretching of the letters was observable, transforming them into an 
analogous surface of stone. In repeatedly moving between the stone surface and the 
view of the grid as aim, I participated in a performance of physically and literally 
moving between seeing and reading, between writer and reader.  
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Figure 35:  
An optic grid produced in aid of the development of anamorphic perspective in the text 
 
The “aim” as an optic devise is similarly employed in a later work entitled Where The 
Landscape Begins: 1 (see figure 36). Exploring the language of surveillance, the 
dynamic between the seer and the seen is revealed; here I have replaced the Dürer 
nude with a segmented sample of a hill as supposedly unspecified and empty 
repository awaiting meaning and description from the distanced observer through an 
optic grid as device. In this manner, the landscape is always observed via a filter or 
screen of comparison and definition; it is mapped by means of the eye and provided 
with an objectified and “universal” meaning, taken in as a homogenising whole 
through the distance that is mediated through the disembodied eye. The “object” is 
alienated and dispossessed of an agency of its own, it is “laid bare” to the eye, to be 
surveyed at will, so that which is inside the frame takes on the passive role of object 
that is to be manipulated and represented. However, upon close inspection, one can 
 123 
make out the simple coded references of a geographic and mapped nomenclature 
specifying the numbers 1 to 8 in the landscape. It is precisely in this cartographic 
clue that I recover an integral relation between the dynamic of surveillance and the 
concept of a described, inscribed and topographic landscape as text. Not only is the 
draughtsman observing a sample of landscape through the grid, the observed 
landscape is already inscribed, communicating the nomenclature of description as 
physically part of the texture and immediacy of the site viewed. The draughtsman is, 
in fact, describing an already described and embodied space: the landscape returns 
his gaze.  
 
 
Figure 36:  
Maja Marx 
Where The Landscape Begins: 1 
2007 
Lino print on Archers 
 
Here the word “landscape”, in its reference to both what the “surveyor was to 
measure and the artist to render” (Alpers 1983:136), elucidates the notion of 
“description”. The Albertian view of the picture as a window with a distanced and 
disembodied human observer is placed next to the notion of the picture as “a surface 
on which to set forth or inscribe the world” (Alpers 1983:137). In this, Where The 
Landscape Begins: 1 clearly resonates the inscriptive traits of the example of the 
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physically mapped site in Jinging, China (see figure 32) where the contours of the 
mountain and cartographic numbers are actually inscribed onto the surface of the 
land with stone and chalk. It is also in direct conversation with one of my 
photographic pieces entitled 12345 (see figure 37).  
 
 
Figure 37:  
Maja Marx 
12345 
2007 
Inscription on koppie 
Laingsburg, South Africa 
Figure 38: Detail of 12345    
 
As a photographic documentation of an inscribed site found near Laingsburg in the 
Karoo, the image reveals what a sharp-eyed passer-by would see: in the far off 
middle ground of a koppie, the numbers 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 are vaguely discernable 
from a left centre position. What a joy to stumble upon a message or code forgotten 
 125 
in the landscape: in its deserted and under-maintained form, the numbers as figure 
almost disappear against the mesmerising sameness and repetition across the Karoo 
landscape as ground. Furthermore, how strange (even surreal) to find such a simple 
code produced on such a grand scale in such a desolate part of the landscape. Like a 
testing sequence, the inscription acts to direct the eye from left to right, the 
numbers - as with a tape measure or ruler - allowing for the calculation of landscape. 
But what is the motivation for this inscription: “the oblique numbers resting on the 
slope of the mountain prompt the viewer to explore further down the slope, 
uncovering a series of man made forms, bunkers, ridges, worn vehicle tracks. Those 
unfamiliar with marksmanship and shooting ranges might not immediately identify 
the subject as such” (Hobbs 2007:21). In this manner the image provides a vital clue 
to the understanding of my artistic method. From a young age I was trained to shoot 
by my father, a master marksman. The act of identifying a target, taking aim and 
hitting it with a bullet surmises much of ocular technology. In applying this as a 
corresponding metaphor for the act of surveillance, it allows the eye to enter the 
landscape haptically, touching it with its gaze. Similarly, the theme of calibration and 
the concept of a targeted point of aim in the landscape surfaces in other works. In 
Cross (see figure 39), we are faced with a view of a koppie inscribed in the fashion of 
a footnote, with a Christian cross and an “X” cross with a number attached27: 
perhaps some sort of “calibration denotation” (Hobbs 2007:20), a negative no-entry 
symbol, an “X marks the spot” sign or perhaps a target - for a parachute jumper, a 
bomber, the eye? The notion of “propelling” one’s eye to a point in the landscape 
implies an enactment of the sliding of the optic into the haptic. In order to view the 
                                           
27 Normally taking on the form of a note of text placed at the bottom of a page in a book or document, the 
footnote is often flagged by a number following that portion of the text that the note is in reference to. 
Typographical devices such as the asterisk (*) or dagger (†) may also be used to point to footnotes.  
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sign, a distance from the immediacy of the inscription is required; at the same the 
purpose of the sign is to “draw the eye in”, to merge touch with sight. In addition, 
this inscription is typically viewed from the seat of a moving vehicle, with the passer-
by establishing a reading of the horizon as demarcated by the X (and in effect also 
the cross), allowing the landscape to be read as a continuous scroll or text.  
 
 
Figure 39:  
Maja Marx 
Cross 
2007 
Inscription on koppie  
Westonaria, South Africa 
 
A Stone’s Throw Away (see figure 40) uses the same haptic language: produced in 
Switzerland in 2006, the work involved the slow process of removing stones from a 
site in the mountains, transporting it onto the jetty of Lac Geronde and then 
performatively throwing the stones back at the mountain. In thus visually “placing” 
or “propelling” the stones onto the inaccessible mountain as a postcard backdrop, I 
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endeavoured to merge two very South African practices centred around the uses of 
stones and power: firstly, the need to place text on mountainside as a process of 
naming and claiming the landscape; secondly evoking the visual language of protest, 
here, against the inaccessibility of the mountain as visual background. As a collection 
of stones is thrown back at the mountain, using a jetty surrounded by a frozen lake 
as launching pad or aim, the eye is propelled into the homogenous and idealist 
landscape that it scrutinises. The futility of this action is measured by the resultant 
radius of stones, which gradually formed on the frozen lake. A Stone’s Throw Away 
locates the subject and measures the body as locus to this action in protest against 
the ocularisation of the landscape. 
       
 
       
Figure 40:  
Maja Marx 
A Stone’s Throw Away 
2006 
Stones removed from mountain and thrown back at mountain 
Lac Geronde, Sierre, Switzerland 
 
As part of the exhibition at The Premises Gallery in Johannesburg, I proceeded to 
illustrate the concept of the eye being transported into the landscape by means of 
two site-objects entitled As Far As The Eye Can Touch - the title work to the 
exhibition (see figures 41, 42, 43, 44), and Where The Landscape Begins: 2 (see 
figures 45, 46, 47. Both work as key installations in the explanation and description 
of my artistic process.  
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Figures 41, 42, 43, 44:  
Maja Marx 
As Far As The Eye Can Touch 
2007 
Steel, chalk, wood and red earth 
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Figures 45, 46, 47:  
Maja Marx 
Where The Landscape Begins: 2 
2007 
Steel, chalk, Perspex 
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Drawing on the visual language of bent-steel farm signs, Renaissance optic devises 
and land surveyor tools, these objects were produced by forming letters out of steel 
and dipping the texts in chalk over a period of time. The result is a group of optic 
devises assembled in such manner as to direct the eye into a simulated landscape. 
Illustrating the anamorphous stretching of letters as found within the immediate 
operating devises of works such as I Am The World On Which I Walk (see figure 34), 
As Far As The Eye Can Touch utilises a double text, demonstrating the ocular shift 
between reading and looking. Firstly one reads a fundamental “hovering” text as 
would be seen from a flattened distance, and secondly one is able to observe a taut 
anamorphic text displaying the optic stretch of the eye within the proximity of 
writing. Fluctuating between text and surface then, the anamorphic text optically 
flutters as the viewer moves, jumping between the lines revealing text and the rusty 
surfaces of the metal bar at times translated as flat plane. In the vein of an “ocular 
rake” the metal text cuts into a heap of red earth, literalising the lines of perspective 
as the eye positions the text on the heap as if it is in fact on a hill. In Where The 
Landscape Begins: 2 I employed a similar illustration of perspectival projection: the 
work comprises of a simple relational layering of levels, firstly applying a metal 
viewfinder with which to position the eye and take aim with, secondly a grid to look 
through, and thirdly a metal chalked text, curved in such way as to point back to the 
eye with all letters simultaneously seen facing the front. On a basic level these 
objects examine the figure ground relation of the text in the landscape and, in 
applying the materiality of the whitewashed stone texts onto the steel letters, the 
text as “horizon” is now brought in close proximity to the eye itself, in effect 
flattening the landscape as ground beyond. In the same way that aim would be 
taken when zooming in on a target in the landscape, the distanced view is brought 
“closer” by means of focus. In this sense, the landscape haptically becomes “as far 
as the eye can touch”, the landscape “beginning” with the eye itself. 
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Returning to the physical inscription of landscape through the use of stones and 
chalk, it is essential to realise the scale on which these texts are produced in the 
landscape. Each letter can easily comprise of more than 25 metres in length, with 
texts like BEAUFORT-WEST stretching up to about 100 metres in width. The 
procedure is basic but by no means undemanding. First the area has to be cleared of 
vegetation: quite typically the rough square of each letter will be cleared of stones, 
large rocks and other impediments. The stones would then be piled to the one side28 
and kept handy for later use in the stacking of flat stone mounds, which from a 
distance, would form the letters in the text. After each letter had been perfected, 
various layers of whitewash are applied.  
 
 
Figures 48:  
Maja Marx 
Stone text 
2007 
Walkerville, South Africa 
 
                                           
28 This is also a common custom when clearing land for agricultural use. Quite often vineyards will be 
tailed by heaps of stones collected and removed from the plots. In the clearing of land we find a 
fundamental domestification of land and an objectification of stone. 
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Figure 49:  
Overgrown inscription 
Cullinan, South Africa 
 
 
Figure 50:  
The untended Cullinan inscriptions, as seen from an aerial perspective 
Cullinan, South Africa 
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It is common to find that these texts are maintained every few years, depending on 
the specific area and climate, but many of the smaller texts have been abandoned 
and are left almost invisible in the landscape. It calls for a trained eye to spot these 
forgotten inscriptions, seeing that without whitewash they tend to be totally 
camouflaged in their surroundings (see figure 48). 
 
The area of Cullinan is the site of similarly discarded inscriptions, dating back to its 
history as a military base during World War II. Even though the chalk on these 
discarded inscriptions are still visible, the texts are overgrown and the surrounding 
area has changed to such a degree that the texts are no longer fully visible, except 
when viewed from an extreme distance or from aerial perspective (see figures 49 & 
50). These untended texts play host to a central aspect of my practical work, namely 
the action of intervening with an existing text. When travelling on the road between 
Rayton and Cullinan north of Pretoria, the word ZONDERWATER - the name of the 
original farm, which now forms part of the Correctional Services facility - is spelled 
out in neatly placed chalked stones. Between November 2006 and March 2007 I 
temporarily “buried” the letter “Z” of ZONDERWATER using 4 cubic metres of earth 
from the area, thus rendering the familiar Zonderwater (literally translated in Dutch 
as “without water”) into Onderwater (the Afrikaans term for “under water”) (see 
figure 51). In visually removing this letter from the text I “buried” the Dutch Colonial 
past embedded in this name29, playing with the power dynamics inherent to colonial 
acts of description, naming and the claiming of the “empty” landscape, and entering 
that history into the current polemics around name changes in the area (consider the 
change from Pretoria to Tswane). 
 
                                           
29  In Afrikaans the term would be spelled SONDERWATER. 
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Figure 51:  
Maja Marx 
Zonderwater: 4 
2006 
Zonderwater Correctional Service, Cullinan, South Africa 
 
The burying of the letter “Z” with earth entailed an act of erasure, and as with I Am 
The World On Which I Walk, was produced in consultation with the Freudian notion of 
the “mystic writing pad”. Through the act of burying, the place “without water” was 
temporarily drowned and positioned “under water” in such a way as to linguistically 
“increase the water level” in the landscape. One might argue that the letter “Z” was 
literally buried into the landscape. However, it is important to note that, as part of 
this grand scale intervention, the process also incorporated the subsequent recovery 
of the 33 metre long letter “Z”. The stones from beneath the earth were uncovered 
in an almost archaeological manner with a brush, and then officially re-chalked with 
the help of prisoners from Zonderwater Correctional service.  
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Figure 52:  
Prisoners rechalking the letter “Z” in the Zonderwater text 
Zonderwater Correctional Service, Cullinan, South Africa 
 
Figure 53:  
Prisoners altering the existing text “RICHMOND”into  
“WWW.RICHMOND.CO.ZA” Richmond, South Africa, 2005 
 
Figure 54:  
Altered stone inscription “WWW.RICHMOND.CO.ZA”, Richmond, 
South Africa, 2005 
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In effect, the original process of inscription was chiasmically reversed and then 
repeated again: with the burying of the letter “Z”, the stones were still there, waiting 
under the surface to be exposed. It is also notable that the same text assembled by 
prisoners a few years before was now recovered by another group of prisoners. In 
this, the dynamics of labour and authority inherent to the phenomenon of these 
chalked stone texts are illustrated. As a convention, these texts often utilised 
correctional labour (see figures 52, 53, 54) - including prisoners of war - as common 
aid, and we find many examples of this and other stonework across the country30. 
 
It is here that we find an alternative layer to the definition of inscription, with the 
introduction of the concept of exscription. Nancy (1993) places the notion of 
exscription in distinction to inscription: in his opinion inscription refers to a kind of 
writing or scripting onto or into something, while exscription is a writing or scripting 
out of something. In this sense exscription signifies a staging, a fragmentation, a 
denunciation and an uncovering, corresponding to exposure and opening. I am of the 
opinion that with the removal and retrieval of the letter “Z” I activated an exscription 
of the text ZONDERWATER, in a sense positioning the reading of the new text 
ONDERWATER as a defamiliarised view to the original. It involves both a covering 
and uncovering, or shall I say a covering as uncovering, seeing that the text had 
been re-scripted out of landscape itself. As a public sign in the landscape, the 
transient return of the text to its former look allows it to carry traces of its own 
erasure in its revealing. In this we find a double defamiliarisation, firstly in the 
absence of the “Z” being noted (see figure 55), and secondly after the subsequent 
return of the “Z”, the “absence” of ONDERWATER being observed. 
 
                                           
30 To highlight a few examples: consider the use of prisoners of war in the building and repairing of 
bridges and roads such as Clarence Drive in the Overberg, the use of correctional labour in the lime 
quarries of Robben Island, and the production of stone texts in areas such as Richmond and Beaufort-
West. 
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Figure 55:  
Image in Rayton & Cullinan local newspaper, Streeknuus, 9 February 2007 
 
As a site, the text is approached via the specified route of the national road, or the 
railway line. In addition, it is – like most other stone texts in the landscape – 
observable from the sky. In the language of cartography, the image of the text from 
its aerial perspective (see figure 56), explores the phenomenon of the landscape as 
inscribed surface and serves to illustrate corresponding qualities to that of the image 
taken of Jinging, China and Jan Christaenz Micker’s View of Amsterdam (see figures 
32 and 31). 
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Figure 56:  
Maja Marx 
Zonderwater: 4 
2006 
Zonderwater Correctional Service, Cullinan, South Africa 
 
In the same manner I looked to the urban locale and de Certeau’s (1984a:93) notion 
of a “totalising” view of the city as text, in distinction to the views of singularity as 
found in the immediate and pedestrian walking of the city. With the series of works 
entitled Pedestrian Poetry, I produced a collection of six painted Zebra crossings in 
Twist Street, central Johannesburg. Using large stencils, the texts were painted 
between 01h00 and 05h00 in what is viewed by some as one of the most perilous 
areas in Johannesburg. The production of the texts took on the performative quality 
of official road construction and marking, including the use of uniforms, official road 
paint, security banners and flashing amber lights. Pedestrian Poetry points to an 
urban account of landscape inscription: in applying a textual intervention on systems 
of both access and division as is found in the case of busy roads and pedestrian 
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crossings in central Johannesburg. As a term, Pedestrian Poetry is indicative of the 
manner in which pedestrians walk the city as a text, with “walking” pointing to the 
narrative unfolding of the text. In this sense, the specific locations chosen for the 
project are crucial; as one of the busiest inner city through fare, Twist Street 
represents a dynamic combination of different modes of movement, an exchange of 
different nationalities and a general space of cultural negotiation. In inscribing the 
pedestrian crossings in Twist Street, I responded to this narrative by inserting 
subjective statements (in the form of poetic text) into the space intended for 
pedestrian crossing. As a whole, the statements function loosely as a poem, with 
each crossing serving as an independent declaration that speaks back to its specific 
location, for example “I AM IN AND OUT OF PLACE” (figure 57) where Troye Street 
becomes Twist Street, “THESE ARE BRIDGEABLE DIVIDES” (figure 61) at the bridge 
crossing between Twist and Noord Street, or “I WALK IN TWO WORLDS” (figure 62) 
between the disparate spaces of Joubert park, the Johannesburg Art Gallery, and the 
inner-city buildings on Bok Street. The texts serve as bridges between point A and B, 
between the one side of the road and the other, between down here and up there. In 
resonance with the transient nature of all of my landscape interventions, these 
painted Zebra crossings have been swallowed by the passing traffic, with the highly 
evocative photographs serving as the only surviving trace and documentation. 
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Figure 57:  
Maja Marx 
Pedestrian Poetry: In & Out  
2007 
Troye and Twist Street, Johannesburg, South Africa 
 
 
Figure 58:  
Maja Marx 
Pedestrian Poetry: Crossing 
2006 
Plein and Twist Street, Johannesburg, South Africa 
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Figure 59:  
Maja Marx 
Pedestrian Poetry: Passing 
2006 
Plein and Twist Street, Johannesburg, South Africa 
 
 
Figure 60:  
Maja Marx 
Pedestrian Poetry: Something 
2006 
De Villiers and Twist Street, Johannesburg, South Africa 
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Figure 61:  
Maja Marx 
Pedestrian Poetry: Bridgeable Divides 
2006 
New Road and Twist Street, Johannesburg, South Africa 
 
 
Figure 62:  
Maja Marx 
Pedestrian Poetry: Two Worlds 
2006 
Bok and Twist Street, Johannesburg, South Africa 
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The documenting images were taken from the view of the top of each building 
immediately concurrent to the text, and involved a lengthy process of negotiating 
access to the private and reputedly unsafe spaces of inner city apartment buildings. 
As seen from down below on street level, the texts disappear into the simple lines of 
zebra crossings. Seated in an approaching vehicle, one is able to scrutinise the texts 
from a distance, only to have them swallowed by the anamorphism of their 
immediacy as one draws closer. It is in this dynamic that I find a diagram of the 
different readings realised by the pedestrian, the moving passer-by and the 
disembodied and perceptually immobile panoptic viewer respectively. Only in leaving 
or approaching the immediacy of the inscription on street level in a state of motion 
can one discern the singular texts to a limited degree. And it is specifically from the 
position of a distanced view atop a building that can one can read the statements in 
static form. In addition, it is only in leaving the even relative immediacy of the 
building top in replacement for a more totalising view from the highest building or 
aircraft that can one distinguish the complete poem.  
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6. Conclusion 
 
The inscription of landscape as surface is by no means a solely South African 
phenomenon, but it is of great importance to consider its worth in providing traces to 
a historiographic invocation of a South African past and the attempts to develop and 
maintain a sense of nationality through an ocular definition of the land. As stationary 
witness to a literalisation of a “labour of hands [that] makes the landscape speak” 
(Coetzee 1988:9), the colonist, farmer or voice of authority felt it necessary to 
supply the landscape with a so-called “voice”. Furthermore, in its inscription, 
landscape is “spoken for”. In the colonial approach to the landscape as supposedly 
“empty” or semiotically “mute”, this kind of inscription engages the physical 
description of the landscape as a surface that is claimed. This approach can be 
viewed as a sub-context to a broader consideration of landscape as text. Following 
the convention of writing as documentation and steady referent, it is precisely 
through this “voice” that we find a revealing citation of the historiographic assertion 
of landscape through its naming and its inscription. It refers not only to an 
annexation of our world, but also involves an attempted physical anchoring of 
description, definition and meaning onto the landscape. In essence, we can 
acknowledge that there is an authority to any writing about landscape, even more so 
to writing onto the landscape.  
 
The inscribed texts on our hills engage the viewer in two distinct modes of 
information gathering: one concerning a fundamental visual examination of the 
landscape as represented image, the other relating to the reading of words. The 
obviously linear, hierarchical and segregated connection between reading and 
writing, reading and seeing, between word (spoken or written) and image, is 
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challenged. Instead one finds a dynamic engagement with the body and with was 
has been called “topographic” space, “a space in which writing is severed from its 
role as mere verbal [or visual] description and instead is experienced as both a 
verbal and visual phenomenon” (Bolter 1991:62). Here the term “verbal” relates to 
the descriptive qualities inherent to text, and “visual” to the perceptual evaluation of 
text as image.  
 
Our awareness of the footnote in the landscape has a vital effect on our reading of 
the landscape and it can be argued that in the physical alteration of these footnotes, 
we are able to transform or alter the reading of the landscape. In this, my subjective 
engagements with the notion of the footnote enable me to enter into a temporary 
dialogue with the general monologue and grand narrative of the “voice” in the 
landscape. 
 
In ascribing the development of these inscriptions closely to the notion of “passage”, 
it is possible to narrowly link the idea of a moving viewer to the function of these 
texts. In South Africa, the surveying traditions of bodies such as the SAR&H were 
poised to develop a sense of nationality through a definition and understanding of 
the “lie of the land” (Foster in Schwartz & Ryan 2003). The close relation between 
photographic representation and railway passage across the landscape allowed for a 
surveying of South Africa. In effect this established a sense of a constant and 
readable terrain and a claiming of that terrain as “belonging”, both pertaining to the 
notion of ownership and to a sense of being in place. Landscape is representation. It 
is a physical and multi-sensory medium in which cultural meanings and principles are 
 146 
encoded, whether they are situated there by the physical transformation of a place, 
or found in a place formed by nature (Mitchell 1994:14). It is readable as text and, in 
light of the notion of passage specifically, as intertext. Landscape as text is never 
“singular”; it is always in overlap with other landscapes past and present, it is multi-
cultural, multi-historical and necessarily without a central or singular author. It can 
be argued that as the viewer passes across the terrain in a train, car or other 
primum mobile (de Certeau 1984a:113), the inscriptions on the distant horizons are 
read as footnotes to the continuous text of the landscape. 
Perceptually, the texts on our hills are interpreted and read in many ways: through a 
distant, totalising and disembodied eye, through a singular immediacy in the 
landscape, and through the sight-touch perception of a moving passer-by. The latter 
reveals a chiasmic slide of the optic into the haptic; a nomadic, itinerant (Deleuze & 
Guattari 1987:494) or mobilised space (Bruno 2007:170) is activated, with a 
cohesive perceptual intertwining of human flesh and the flesh of the world (Merleau-
Ponty 1968). 
 
Phenomenologically, we could argue that the bodily engagement with the world 
occurs on the border between body and its surroundings, at its margins. In this 
sense Flesh is not a substance in-between the body and the world but is to be 
understood functionally as “texture, articulation, framework, joints, as an element in 
which we live and move . . . an intertwining that forms between things, others and 
myself, a chiasmus or a chiasma (Waldenfels 1998:288-89). Merleau-Ponty proposes 
that the understanding of the world as not simply an object does not mean there was 
a fusion or coinciding of me with it. On the contrary, he proposes that this occurs 
because “a sort of dehiscence opens my body in two, and because between my body 
looked at and my body looking, my body touched and my body touching, there is 
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overlapping or encroachment, so that we may say that the things pass into us, as 
well as we into the things (1968: 123).  
 
This not only relates to our ability to touch but also to the chiasmic cohesion between 
sight and touch. As we move through the landscape, fore-grounded and proximate 
space cannot be absorbed visually; instead we focus on distant space. As distant 
space moves by in a “series of . . . pictures or scenes created by the continuously 
changing perspective” (Schivelbusch 1977:64), the traveller effectively sees the 
landscape through the apparatus moving him through the world, so that “evanescent 
reality has become the new reality” (Schivelbusch 1977:64). In this set-up, the 
fleeting view takes on a paradoxical function of an unchanging scene. Consider the 
transaction that occurs between a passage through space and the point of 
disappearance as a focal point: it can be argued that the motion of the traveller 
super-imposes a pattern of outflow and inflow upon the environment and that from 
this the traveller obtains an “idea of an objective world, of that which does not 
change as one changes” (Leed 1991:75). The evanescent view supplies a fourth wall, 
both separating and tying the viewer to the action in the landscape. To add to this, 
there seems to exist a sense in the passing observer that everything on the outside 
is always moving towards one, “through” one, with elements on the horizon - such 
as text - providing the only fleeting “fixed” points of reference on the outside.  
 
Like the childhood game of following a mark in the landscape along its route through 
a car window, the South African phenomenon of marked hills operate as a simple 
resting place for the eye to trace its movement through the landscape and as aim for 
the eye to be haptically propelled into that landscape. Of course, the textual 
instructions not only mark the horizon but also wish to aid in the specific reading of 
landscape as text. It can be argued that as footnotes, these inscriptions act as literal 
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textual references, revealing the non-literal textual nature of the landscape and at 
the same time affirming the reading of the landscape as text. In this sense, the 
footnote on the koppie discloses the landscape as both surface for inscription and as 
embodied space that can be travelled across.  
 
Travelling, in this sense, is an act of reading, as the journey or passage across the 
landscape reveals an incessant text; the inscriptions on the passing hills operate as 
footnotes in the continuum of the landscape as text. As topographic space merges 
into embodied space, the optic slides into the haptic, with the chalked stone texts on 
the South African koppies providing a literalisation of the cartographic description of 
the landscape as a surface on which to inscribe the world (Alpers 1983:137) and a 
haptic embodiment of that landscape through our itinerant reading of this text in the 
course of passage. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Word count: 33,617. 
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